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The present thesis is made up by three separates chapters in applied microeco-
nomics touching the realms of labor, health and family economics. The first one
considers individual genetic information to explore the interplay between genes
and environmental factors in shaping individual labor outcomes. The second one
looks at old age health and provide an estimate of the causal effect of retirement on
a syndrome of health deficit accumulation called frailty. The third one investigates
and describes the role of preferences in the screening and matching process of
child adoption with the use of a novel dataset.
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in late working age labor market outcomes
Abstract
We investigate the interaction between negative labour market shocks in the
United States and genetic predisposition to educational attainment as measured
by polygenic score in determining unemployment in late working age. We exploit
variation at State and industry level in the peak time of mass lay-off events and
initial unemployment benefit claims in the period following the great recession to
identify exogenous labour market shocks to the probability of unemployment. We
provide evidence for polygenic score for educational attainment being a protective
factor against unemployment status in late working life even after controlling for
education and college completion.
10
1.1 Introduction
Late working life has been extensively investigated as a crucial transitional period
with significant potential consequences not only with respect to individual health
trajectories in later life (Moon et al. (2012);Coe and Zamarro (2011); Behncke
(2012); Hessel et al. (2018)) but also with respect to pension systems and public
finance (Hicks (2011),Brugiavini and Peracchi (2005)). With this study, by exploit-
ing recent findings in the genomic and bio-informatics literature we explore the
interplay between environmental factors and individual genetic endowment in
late working life labor market outcomes. More precisely, we study the interaction
between negative labour market shocks in the United States and individual genetic
predisposition for educational attainment in determining unemployment status.
Before going to the reasons why we think genetic predisposition for educational
attainment is relevant in the context of late working life it is useful to think of the
general implications of unemployment in this life period. Of course, experiencing
adverse labor market conditions can be associated with less employment, but
interestingly, in late working life this is also related to decreased health insurance
coverage and longevity (Coile et al. (2012)). Moreover, older workers experiencing
unemployment have significantly lower re-employment rates because of reasons
spanning from skills mismatch to age discrimination (Lahey (2005); Malul (2009);
Axelrad et al. (2018)). In this context, the possibility to identify individuals at
higher risk of negative labor market outcomes could be leveraged to better target
preventive measures or even active labour market interventions.
To justify the link between genetic predisposition to educational attainment and
labor market outcomes we build on recent findings by Papageorge and Thom
(2018) who suggest genetic predisposition for educational attainment being also
indicative of a general predisposition to keep acquiring skills related to ana-
lytical non-routine tasks beyond formal education. This suggests that genetic
predisposition for education could indeed be telling something more, for example,
predisposition to learn or acquire new competences and skills.
If this is indeed the case, one could expect individuals with higher genetic predis-
position to educational attainment, to be also more able to expand their human
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capital beyond education itself, and so to be on average more productive in the
workplace, all the rest being equal. As an example one could think of learn-
ing to use a new software, a novel programming language or generally facing a
new working context. Most interestingly, it would be in late working age where
differences in genetic endowment (beyond education itself) would reflect more
the underlying differences in the latent human capital and, as a consequence, in
productivity. Then, to the extent to which predisposition to educational attain-
ment also contribute to general human capital accumulation beyond education
and so late working age productivity, we would expect individuals with higher
predisposition for educational attainment to be less likely to be laid off or lose
their job once a negative labour market shock hits. In other words this mean
expecting workers with lower genetic predisposition to educational attainment to
be less productive and so more likely to represent the so called marginal worker.
Alternatively, but along the same reasoning, one could think of individuals with
higher predisposition for education to be more likely to find a new job after having
lost one. It is fair to say that our framework of analysis does not allows to perfectly
distinguish between these two cases as in our data individuals are observed only
every two years.
We test this interpretation of a defined measure of genetic predisposition to edu-
cational attainment by identifying a negative labor market shock and assessing
heterogeneous effects to probability of unemployment along this genetic dimen-
sion. Before going into the details of the study, we provide a sort of first landing
yet not exhaustive guide to genetics in social science.1
1.2 From Genetics and Economics to Geno-economics
Since the completion of the human genome project in 2001 (et al. (2001),Craig
Venter et al. (2001), the role of genetic information have largely and increas-
ingly been questioned and explicitly investigated. While at first, also because
of significant knowledge entrance barriers, most of the research was exclusively
1For further details readers can refer to Conley (2009), Beauchamp et al. (2011) and Benjamin
et al. (2012).
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held within the realm of biology and molecular medicine, as sequencing and
imputation technologies as well as analytical methodologies became more and
more accessible, more and less contiguous research fields became aware of the
relevance of genetics and, as a consequence, interested in incorporating it into
more traditional frameworks.
This happened with economics as well, with theorists working in insurance de-
bating on the relevance of such information for an industry deeply dissected
with regard to issues of adverse selection and moral hazard (Hoy and Polborn
(2000), Barigozzi and Henriet (2011). However, aside empirical studies on twins
(Ashenfelter and Krueger (2019); Conley and Strully (2012)), little has been done
so far to explicitly incorporate genetic information into economics.
Recent developments and continuous decreasing costs of genotyping promise
extremely easily available individual genetic information leading some scholars
to focus on the explicit role of such information for social science (Beauchamp
et al. (2011); Benjamin et al. (2012)) and related policy relevant issues (Lehrer and
Ding (2017)). In principle, opportunities for social scientists, and economists in
particular, are related to two main approaches with regard to the use of genetic
information: as instrumental variable in a so called Mendelian Randomization
Study (Conley and Zhang (2018); Van Kippersluis and Rietveld (2018))2, and
finally, gene-environment interaction studies or "GXE" (Conley (2009)). In the
current study we focus on the latter.
1.2.1 Polygenic Scores
In practical terms, applied researchers can exploit genetic information in the form
of polygenic scores (PGSs). A PGS is a synthetic measure of genetic predisposition
for a given phenotype (i.e. an observable outcome or condition determined both
by genetic and environmental factors) built on the basis of the presence, for a
given individual, of a certain set on genetic mutations called Single Nucleotide
2While the use of individual level genetic information as instrumental variable (i.e. Mendelian
Randomizazion) is not entirely new to fields like epidemiology, research to date have almost
entirely overlooked the potential violation of the key exclusion restriction assumption due to
highly likely pleyotropic effects of genetic endowment.
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Polymorphisms (SNPs). Such genetic mutation is the single most commonly
occurring mutation that happens at the level of single building block of our DNA
sequence: the nucleotide. Nucleotides are molecules made by a nitrogenous base,
sugar and a phosphate group which generally defines the nucleotide as A, T, C, or
G. Whenever there is a mutation of a given nucleotide in the DNA sequence, in a
relevant share of the whole population (i.e. more than 1%), we call it a SNP. As
already mentioned, SNPs are extremely common forms of mutation in our DNA
and their position with respect to a gene can either have no effect at all on its
functioning or influence its expression (modulation with environmental factors),
heritability or favour the development of some disease (Beauchamp et al. (2011);
Benjamin et al. (2012)).
This being said, one can define a PGS for a give phenotype as a weighted sum
of the SNPs’ effect on such phenotype where weights are defined on the basis of
genome-wide association studies (GWAS). These association studies consist in the
estimation through separate regressions of the effect of each genotyped SNP on the
outcome of interest3. Once the estimates are computed, their significance is tested
at a p-value threshold adjusted for multiple testing hypothesis by Bonferroni
correction. The so called "genome-wide significance" threshold level is normally
set at 5.5 10−8.





where xij is the number of reference allele (zero, one or two) for individual i and
SNP j and wj is the SNP’s coefficient from the reference GWAS. By reference allele
we mean the presence of a mutation, with respect to the most common genetic
variant, in either one or two copies of an individual’s DNA. The reference allele is
zero when there is no mutation at the precise locus in the DNA sequence where a
3Note that at this stage control covariates such as gender, age polynomials, age and gender
interactions and the first ten genetic principal components are included. Most importantly, the
first ten genetic principal components are included to control for possible population stratification
in the genetic endowment of the individuals. By this we refer to the systematic difference in allele
frequencies between different groups of a population (see Ware et al. (2018), Beauchamp et al.
(2011) and Benjamin et al. (2012) for further details).
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SNP could be observed. Whenever there is a SNP only in one copy of the DNA
sequence instead, this mean that the individual inherited the mutation from only
one of the two parents (heterozygosity) and the allele reference is therefore one
while, if the mutation is present in both copies of the DNA, it means that both
parents transmitted the mutation (homozygosity). In this latter case the reference
allele is two (Ware et al. (2018); Beauchamp et al. (2011)). The polygenic score is
then standardized to have mean zero and variance equal to one.
It is important to note that unless researchers are capable of controlling for par-
ental genotype, the nature of the PGS itself does not allow a causal interpretation
with respect to the outcome of interest. In other words, it is difficult, if not im-
possible, to completely disentangle the "true genetic effect" from environmental
channels taking place in the downstream of it. As an example, taking into account
a PGS for BMI (Locke et al. (2015)) we could in principle expect particular familiar
environment to play a role in addition to genetic endowment in determining
individual’s BMI. This is to say that as a newborn inherits his/her DNA from the
parents, he/she will also experience a certain environment which is correlated
with his/her parents’ DNA. Again, as suggested in Schmitz and Conley (2016)),
also upstream mediating channels such as in-utero environment affected by moth-
ers eating or smoking behaviour are theoretically possible, making the relation
between polygenic score potentially spurious. Given this limitations, it is possible
to claim SNPs to be as good as randomly assigned at conception only conditionally
on parental genotype (Schmitz and Conley (2017)). Whenever it is not possible to
account for parental genotypes, as it is in most of the cases due to data limitation,
SNPs and consequently polygenic scores should be interpreted as predetermined.
The lack of causal interpretation, does not make the analysis useless though. While
it is true that it is mostly impossible to pin down the true genetic effect reflecting
solely biological pathways from the DNA sequence to given phenotypes, SNPs
weights and polygenic scores do capture it. The genetic effect is likely inflated
by environmental factors which are not strictly genetic but which are inherited
alongside the genetic structure. This includes any sort of discrimination happening




First and foremost we broadly contribute to the already cited literature on the use
of genetic information in economics and social science (Beauchamp et al. (2011);
Benjamin et al. (2012); Lehrer and Ding (2017); Conley and Zhang (2018); Van
Kippersluis and Rietveld (2018)).
More precisely, we contribute to a recent but rapidly growing literature on the
interaction between genetic and environmental factors in determining observable
outcomes. By explicitly including genetic information in more traditional frame-
works, research shifted heavily from the so called nature versus nurture debate to
investigating the actual interplay between the two. While GXE studies are not new
to medicine or realms like epidemiology and biology (Ottman (1996)), recent dis-
coveries in genome-wide significant SNPs for traits such as educational attainment
(Okbay et al. (2016); Lee et al. (2018)) but also BMI (Locke et al. (2015)) and risk
tolerance (Karlsson Linnér et al. (2019)) which are traditionally highly relevant
in economic research are driving a surge of interest also among economists with
most of the studies referring to health and education economics.
Starting from the health domain, Biroli (2015) proposes a theoretic framework
for BMI and human capital formation that explicitly account for the role of
genetics and molecular biology in which GxE interaction play a "pivotal role" in
the evolution of BMI. More specifically, the author presents a model where genes
influence both the health production function ("genetic productivity effect": how
productively inputs are converted into outputs) as well as individuals’ preferences,
thus affecting the implicit cost of investment in health capital ("genetic cost effect").
Schmitz and Conley (2016) look at the interaction between unemployment status
and a PGS for BMI in the Health and Retirement Study showing heterogeneity
in the effect of job loss on BMI, with high risk individuals being more likely to
gain weight when losing jobs. With respect to mental health instead and again
within the Health and Retirement Study, Domingue et al. (2017) focus on the
interaction between a score for genetic predisposition to subjective well-being and
a stressor event like the death of a spouse in determining depressive symptoms.
16
Results show a significant protective effect of genetic predisposition for subjective
well-being with respect a spouse’s death.
Bridging the health and the education realms, Amin et al. (2017) investigate
gene-environment interactions between education and BMI in a sample from UK
and Finland. The study evidences a statistically significant negative association
between education and BMI as well as a statistically positive association between
the genetic endowment and BMI but no significant interaction effect.
Shifting instead completely to education, Schmitz and Conley (2017) investigate
the effect on education of veteran status as instrumented by the Vietnam lottery
draft and interacted with a PGS for educational attainment. The authors report
veterans with below average PGS being more likely to collect less years of schooling
as compared to non veterans with similar polygenic scores.
More interestingly for our framework, Papageorge and Thom (2018) investigates
the interaction between a PGS for educational attainment4 and childhood socio-
economic status in the Health and Retirement Study finding a significant main
genetic effect with respect to college graduation as well as a significant interaction
with childhood socio economic status suggesting possible concerns of wasted
potential when growing up in lower socio-economic status. More relevant to our
setting, Authors also find that the PGS for educational attainment predicts labour
market outcomes such as earning and employment even after controlling for edu-
cation and college completion. By analysing the time variation in earnings and the
relationship with the PGS they argue the score to be indicative of something more
than just predisposition for educational attainment and rather, predisposition to
accommodate ongoing skill biased technological changes.
Table 1.1 replicate some of the results in Papageorge and Thom (2018) with few
modifications. First and foremost, not having access to external data other than
the HRS, we rely on self reported earnings for the outcome variable. On the other
hand we use a more updated version of the polygenic score (Lee et al. (2018))
and we also able to control for State and industry of occupation. Results are
qualitatively comparable to those of the original study. Even after controlling for
4The authors use a polygenic score based on the weights as estimated in Okbay et al. (2016).
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Table 1.1: OLS for labor earnings over education and polygenic score
Log(Earnings)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
PGS_EA 0.112*** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.029** 0.022**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Educational Attainment 0.011** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
College 0.399*** 0.345*** 0.351*** 0.330***
(0.037) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Constant 10.148*** 8.857*** 9.843*** 10.127*** 10.084***
(0.080) (0.789) (0.269) (0.140) (0.217)
PC 1-10 Y Y Y Y Y
PC 1-10 * Educ. Att. Y Y Y Y Y
PC 1-10 * College Y Y Y Y Y
Gender Y Y Y Y Y
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Birth year Y Y Y Y Y
Interview year Y Y Y Y Y
State & Ind. dummies Y
Age Range 25-65 25-65 40-65 50-65 50-65
Employment earnings >0 >10,000 >10,000 >10,000 >10,000
N 13755 9923 8879 8427 8427
R2 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.18
Note: Columns (a) to (d) replicate the results from Papageorge and Thom (2018) with our working
sample and few consequential modifications. The dependent variable is self reported labor
earnings. PGS_EA is Lee et al. (2018). Column (e) also controls for State and industry dummies.
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formal education, its interaction with the first ten genetic principal components
as well as State and industry fixed effects (not to mention other usual controls),
the polygenic score remains predictive of the Log(earning).
Beyond the GXE setting, other studies focused on the polygenic score for educa-
tional attainment and its interpretation. Along the same line of Papageorge and
Thom (2018), investigating wealth inequality, Barth et al. (2019) provide evidence
of polygenic scores for educational attainment being associated with wealth not
only through education and earnings but also via financial decision making. To the
best of our knowledge, Rustichini et al. (2018) and citeWilloughby2019, provide
to date the only educational attainment polygenic score analysis capable of con-
trolling for parental genotypes and family environment. Rustichini et al. (2018)
propose a model of intergenerational mobility and subsequently investigate the
channels between PGS and educational outcomes disentangling cognitive skills
from personality traits. Results points to both spheres being relevant, with intelli-
gence accounting for a larger proportion. Most interestingly, by controlling for
mothers’ and fathers’ PGSs, the study provide evidence of the presence of parental
environmental effect. Nevertheless, the coefficients of the parental PGS for edu-
cational attainment becomes very close to zero and non significant once controls
like parental education and family income are taken into account in regressions
for both GPA and years of education. This can give an idea of the extent to which
estimates of main genetic effect could be inflated by environmental channels if
one can not control for the appropriate familiar variables. In a model for GPA the
polygenic score’s effect remains highly significant decreasing by roughly 30% in
point size estimate. On the other hand, in a model for educational attainment the
coefficient drops by only 8% still remaining highly significant. This is important
evidence of the fact that while parent environmental channels are non negligible,
they are not the only responsible for educational outcomes of off-springs with the
larger proportion of the effect captured by polygenic score being indeed genetic.
1.4 Data
The study uses two separate sources of data. On the one hand, information
regarding individuals’ working status, demographic controls and polygenic scores
19
are from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) while, negative labor market
shocks are built using data on mass lay-off and initial unemployment benefit
claims from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
1.4.1 Health and Retirement Study and polygenic score
The Health and Retirement Study is a representative panel data survey collecting
information every two years on domains like health, labor and socio-economic
status every two years among individuals of 50 or more years old, together with
their spouses and partners. Since 2006, by mean of a so called "enhanced face to
face interview" the study started collecting saliva samples for genotyping together
with other general biomarkers. In 2006, half of the interviewees were randomly
selected for such enhanced interview of which, roughly 85% agreed. The other
half was instead selected in the following wave in 2008. The same was done in the
two subsequent waves in 2010 and 2012.
Polygenic scores are provided for a rich set of phenotypes ranging from BMI to
neuroticism, Alzheimer disease and of course educational attainment. The HRS
provides polygenic scores computed using all available SNPs overlapping with
those of the original genome-wide meta-analysis without any p-value thresholding.
To obtain externally valid SNP weights, whenever the original discovery sample
included HRS individuals, the GWAS analysis was repeated excluding HRS data.
We use the latest PGS for educational attainment as developed by Lee et al. (2018)
with an original discovery sample of 1,1 million individuals and 1,271 genome-
wide significant SNPs found.
For our analysis we restrict the sample to individual between 50 and 65 years of
age, interviewed between 2006 and 2014 who were either self-declared employed
or self-employed in 2006 which is the last wave before the Great Recession. We
do so because the nature of the labour market data we exploit does not allows
us to capture positive fluctuations of the labor market but only negative shocks.
As a matter of fact we are interested in the transition from employment or self-
employment to unemployment and/or exiting the labor force via (early)retirement
or disability.
20







age 59.131 59.240 59.252
number of children 0.440 0.384 0.354
years of education 13.642 13.918 14.036
unemployed 0.027 0.024 0.024
income 33,154 34,346 35,720
diabetes 0.166 0.158 0.146
Hispanic 0.098 0.000 0.000
Afro-american 0.131 0.144 0.000
Caucasian 0.804 0.850 0.995
N 15350 10893 8499
In order to control for confounders at ancestry group level we follow usual recom-
mendations from the literature and the Health and Retirement Study itself and
further restrict to individual with European ancestry excluding individuals with
Afro-American ancestry. This restriction also reflects a general limitation of the
genomic literature to date which is the lack of predictive power of estimated SNPs’
effect outside of the European ancestry group. Such lack of predictive power is
due to under-representation of non European in the data suitable GWAS analysis.
As a result of this under-representation, SNPs weight for Afro-American ancestry
groups are considerably less predictive of which ever phenotype of interest is
under investigation. It is worth noting that for the same reasoning the Health and
Retirement Study do not provide polygenic score for Hispanic individuals.
This lead us to a pooled working sample of 8,499 observations consisting in
roughly 3,500 individuals observed throughout the considered waves. As summar-
ized in Table 1.2, it is fair to say that both the 85% take-up rate of the enhanced
face-to-face interview and the restriction to European ancestry contribute to a
non negligible selection of the sample with respect to certain dimensions which
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Figure 1.1: Sample distribution across States. HRS, waves 2006 - 2014.
are indeed interesting for the outcomes under investigations. With respect to the
general population of the Health and Retirement Study, column 3 of Table 1.2
describes a sample which is on average slightly more educated, with less kids,
with higher income less chances of self reporting unemployment status as well
as lower risk of being diagnosed with diabetes. As expected, no self reported
Afro-American as well as Hispanic individual is present in the final sample. Over-
all, despite representing a limitation for the external validity of our findings this
forced selection is also making our results more salient. In fact, focusing within a
sub-population with higher average PGS and which is for whatever reason less
likely to experience the environmental shock at the basis of the gene-environment
interaction under investigation would suggest to interpret point estimates as a
lower bound.
For each individual at every point in time we know his/her residence location at
county level as well as the industry of occupation at two digits NAICS level. We
use information on the geographical location and industry of occupation to merge
individual level data from the Health and Retirment Study with labor market data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. California, Florida and Michigan are the three
most populous States in the HRS give the sample restriction adopted (see Figure
1.1). In terms of industries, most of the working sample is employed in healthcare,
manufacturing and educational services sector. Interestingly, with the exception
of art and entertainment and agriculture, which nevertheless represent a small
22
Figure 1.2: Workers and unemployed distribution across industries. HRS, waves
2006 - 2014.
proportion of the sample) in every sector we find an appreciable proportion of the
pooled sample is unemployed going from the 0.7% for public administration to
3.9% of real estate.
1.4.2 Labor Market
It is important to note that while providing evidence of negative labor market
shocks impacting individual employment status could be seen as effort to prove
the obvious, we should still pay attention at the way we estimate the effect of these
shocks. As a matter of fact, a proper identification of the environmental effect
is key to providing a thoughtful interpretation of the interaction with genetic
endowment.
In order to identify negative labor market shocks we rely on data from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics in the US. We use data at state, industry and month level
about mass layoff events and initial unemployment benefit claims in alternative
specifications for robustness purposes. To make sure that the effect we identify is
not artificially driven by the way we define peaks in either mass lay-off or benefit
claims, we also provide an alternative set of results based on unemployment rate
at county level.
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The Bureau of Labor Statistics defines a mass layoff event whenever a firm lays
off at least 50 employees within a 5 weeks period. On the other hand, initial
unemployment benefit claims are the number of claims filed in order to obtain
unemployment benefits. The two measures are obviously correlated but yet
capture slightly different margins of the same phenomenon. On the one hand,
mass lay-off events capture the intensive margin of negative labour market shocks
while unemployment benefit claims do capture the extensive one. In the main
set of results we define a negative labor market shock as a peak in mass lay-off,
devoting benefit claims data to robustness. As a matter of fact, initial benefit
claims data are more likely to capture seasonal turnover in the labor force, making
peaks harder to identify due to noisier trends.
We define a peak in mass lay-offs (P eakMLdst) for industry d, State s at time t
as a dichotomous variable taking value one for that industry state and time cell
whenever mass lay-offs are greater or equal than k times the mass-layoffs’ average
along the considered period. In the main set of results the factor k takes a value of
three.5
P eakMLdst = 1 if mldst > k ∗mlds (1.2)
As we will describe in more detail in the following section, we rely on the timing of
the peaks among state-industry pairs to identify the effect of negative labor market
shocks on one’s employment status. The reader will have noticed that P eakMLdst
allows for multiple peaks within state-industry pairs but, exploiting the panel
dimension of our dataset, we will focus on the first peak along the considered
time frame as measure of negative labor market shock. This reconciles the need
to capture shocks throughout the entirety of the considered waves as well as to
emphasize the consequences of the Great Recession for those industries that are
typically more affected by the economic cycle.
It comes with no surprise that industries such as manufacturing, retail trade or
construction can suffer more the economic cycle with respect to industries such as
healthcare or education for which lay-offs, if present, are more likely to be due to
5For robustness purposes, we provide results using alternative values for the factor k.
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Figure 1.3: Interviews distribution over time and mass lay-offs peaking time for
the Health Care and Social Assistance sector.
regular turnover or seasonality than macro economic conditions. In the first case
we do expect peaks to appear really close to recessions, no matter how they are
actually measured. On the other hand, as the industry is not immediately affected
by the economic cycle, mass lay-offs could either manifest later on, not happen at
all or show some kind of repeated pattern just above the zero without any clear
peak. Defining a peak as in (2) with large enough k allows to exclude these minor
movements and focus on more salient cases.
Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 describe interviews distribution and highlight the timing
of peak in mass-layoff as described in equation (2) across different States for the
two most popular industries in the sample: health care and manufacturing. As
anticipated, for manufacturing most of the States exhibit a peak in mass lay-off
around the Great Recession, between late 2008 and 2009. For the health care
sector instead, peaks are more evenly distributed. Another interesting point to
emphasize is the interviews distribution. For each wave to be collected, interviews
take no less than a year, giving us the opportunity to exploit the combination of
heterogeneity in the timing of the peaks and timing of interviews for identification.
As a consequence, our identification of the effect of labor market shocks do not
solely exploit peaks happening at different times between waves but also during
waves.
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Figure 1.4: Interviews distribution over time and mass lay-offs peaking time for
the Manufacturing sector.
1.5 Methodology
Rather then starting directly with the aim of a specification for the interaction
between the polygenic score and the environmental shock, for the sake of clarity
and interpretative purposes with respect to the final results, we firstly focus
our attention to the proper identification of the labor market shocks’ effect on
unemployment status. In this context the main issues for a credible identification
are simultaneity, omitted variable bias and selection. The first one implies a
bi-directional causal link between treatment and outcome which in our case are
peaks in mass lay-off and individual unemployment status. To cope with this
threat, first of all we rely on the nature of our measure for negative labor market
shocks. By considering peaks of mass lay-off we use information at State-industry
level over a 9 years time period to identify an event which predicts individual
level probability of unemployment. While at first glance the simultaneous link
between the two seems obvious, it is indeed hard to claim that a single worker
displacement is not simply a cause of a single mass lay-off but a peak in mass
lay-offs for a given industry in a given State. It is worth recalling that a mass
lay-off is registered whenever a single firm displaces at least 50 employee within a
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five weeks period. A further but by no mean less important factor which makes
us confident in the exogenous nature of our shock variable (at least with respect
to simultaneity concerns) is the particular time frame under consideration which
highlight the role of the Great Recession (e.g. Figure 1.4).
Before tackling the other two issues it is useful to introduce a first tentative
approach in modelling probability of unemployment. Given the panel structure
of our data, the obvious starting point is a difference in difference approach (DD).
Yit = β0 + β1Ti + β2P ostt + β3(P ost ∗ T )it + β8Xit + εit (1.3)
Yit is a dichotomous variable being equal to one if individual i is unemployed
at the time of the interview t and zero otherwise. Ti is a dichotomous variable
equal to one if individual i has been exposed to a shock in the labor market.6
P ostt is another dichotomous variable being activated once individuals in the
treated group have received the treatment, (P ost ∗ T )it is the interaction term Xit
represents a vector of time varying controls for individual i and εi an error term.
The model in equation (3) suffers from two important problems. To begin with, it
does not consider the structure of labor market shocks data. As treated workers
are affected by labor market shocks at different times depending on which State-
industry pair they belong to, it is not possible to identify P ostt for non treated
individuals. In other words, equation (3) neglects the main source of variation
we can exploit to identify the environmental shock, that is time variation in the
peak of mass lay-off across States and industries. A second major problem is
omitted variable bias which may arise from Ti being correlated with the error
term. Suffering a negative labor market shock in a given State and industry could
in fact be correlated with unobserved individual characteristics spanning from
preferences over the choice of industry to work in, the choice of the State or
even to skills as well as familiar socio-economic status. To some extent the same
problem could be seen as a selection issue but for completeness we will specifically
address this when considering the genetic endowment. Of course, the choice of
6Note that a this stage this simply means belonging to a State-industry pair for which we
identify a peak in mass-lay-off at some point between 2006 and 2015.
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the industry and State can not solely be due to preferences or skills as educational
attainment and its genetic predisposition are likely to play a role.
To face these problem a second step is to exploit the panel dimension of the data
by estimating a generalized difference in difference with treatment at different
times by group with a fixed effect (FE) model as in equation (4). This allows to
avoid omitted variable bias as long as the omitted information correlated with the
shock variable is time constant.
Yit = β0 + β1P ost.P eakMLidst + β2Xit
+ ai +λt +γds + νdst + εit
(1.4)
P ost.P eakMLidst is a dummy equal to one if individual i in industry d and State s
has suffered a peak of mass lay-off in between time t and t−1. The variable is zero
for every individual in the sample at first observation in 2006, it gets a value of one
once a peak happens in individual i’s State-industry group and it remains equal to
one throughout the available waves. As a consequence, P ost.P eakMLidst captures
the effect of being exposed to a negative labor market shock on the probability of
unemployment. Following Hansen (2007) and Bertrand et al. (2004), equation (4)
includes an individual specific term ai , time effects λt, group effects γds as well as
a set of time/group interactions νdst and an error term εit.
In our case groups are indeed the product of States and industries pairs. Consider-
ing that in the United States there are 50 States and according to the the two digits
NAICS industry classification we can distinguish 20 industries, on paper this
translates into a thousand groups. If this was not enough of a concern, considering
the interaction between groups and time effects we would theoretically have four
thousand control.7
For feasibility constraints as well as interpretative concerns we follow Imbens
and Wooldridge (2008) and Bertrand et al. (2004) and disregard νdst assuming
individual level observation as independent. Again, it is not feasible to estimate a
model including all of our group fixed effects γds and, even if possible, that would
most likely be a huge source over-fitting considering the dimension of our panel.
7One out of the five waves would be considered as reference category.
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As a second best we control for industry effects ρd and State effects ηs which,
nevertheless are the main components of our groups. This leads to equation (5).
Yit = β0 + β1P ost.P eakMLidst + β2Xit
+ ai +λt + ρd + ηs + εit
(1.5)
Notice that both in equation (4) and (5), P ost.P eakMLidst is equivalent to (P ost∗T )it
of equation (3). The main difference between (3) and the subsequent models
(4) and (5) lays on the fact that in the latter models individual time constant
characteristics are accounted for by construction thanks to the within estimator.
Interestingly enough, this implies that not only that Ti is wiped out while time
trend are accounted for by λt but also that we would not be able to explicitly
include any individual time constant variable such as a polygenic score.
To cope with this we dichotomize the poligenic score at one standard deviation
creating HighPGSi : a dummy variable equal to one for individuals with polygenic
score beyond one and zero otherwise and interact it with P ost.P eakMLidst. The
resulting model (6) resembles a generalized triple difference in difference (DDD)
with treatment occurring at different times.
Yit = β0 + β1P ost.P eakMLidst + β2Xit
+ β3HighPGSi ∗ P ost.P eakMLidst
+ β4Collegei ∗ P ost.P eakMLidst
+ ai +λt + ρd + ηs + εit
(1.6)
Notice that in order to assess the additional informative power of the polygenic
score we would like to control for formal education but, as for any other individual
specific time constant variables, the within estimator cancels it out. Consequently,
as for the polygenic score we create a dummy variable for having obtained a col-
lege degree and we interact it with the shock variable. In terms of interpretation
β1 has positive expected sign and represents the increase in the probability of
unemployment due to having suffered a negative labor market shock as defined by
a peak in mass lay-off in a given state-industry pair for individuals without a col-
lege degree and a polygenic score for educational attainment below one standard
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deviation. Conversely, β3 would have negative expected sign and represent the
change in probability of unemployment when suffering a shock for individuals
with a polygenic score above one standard deviation. β4 would also have negative
expected sign and represent the change in probability of unemployment when
suffering a shock for individuals with a college degree.
While simultaneity and omitted variable bias have been tackled with regard to
our identification of labor market shocks, few consideration should be made with
regard to the interpretation of the polygenic score introduced from equation (6).
Notice that since we are not able to control for parental genotype for individual
in our sample, this should not be intended as being in the pursuit of a causal
interpretation of the genetic endowment but rather we hope to precisely highlight
which aspect represents the more salient threat to assessing the protective effect
of high polygenic score for educational attainment.
It is quite straightforward that being the sequence of SNPs determined at con-
ception, simultaneity is not an issue for the interpretation of β3. As a matter of
fact, there is no way labor market outcomes in late working age could be a causal
factor for a polygenic score which is in fact fixed at conception. On the other
hand, omitted variable may be an issue as long as the omitted information is both
correlated with the polygenic score and probability of unemployment and it is
time variant. Of course, a major candidate would be industry or state specific
labor market fluctuations which we already control for. Formal education would
also be a candidate but as mentioned above we already control for it both directly
including an interaction term of a dummy for college degree and labor market
shock and indirectly using the within estimator.
The most problematic aspect for interpreting the β3 in equation (6) as protective
effect of genetic predisposition to education with respect to negative labor market
shocks is given by selection. As the exposure to shocks (as well as its timing) is a
function of the combination of State and industry to which the worker belongs
to, one may argue that β3 reflects the selection into specific State-industry groups
rather than a some protective effect rooted into skills or human capital. With
this regard it is worth noticing that in model (6) the poligenic score dummy is
itself interacted with P ost.P eakMLidst. This means that β3 describes the change in
30
probability of unemployment for those who actually experienced a shock having
a high polygenic score. In other words it captures the effect of heterogeneity in
the polygenic score within those experiencing a peak in mass lay-off as described
in (2). However, while our shock measure identifies spikes beyond three times the
average of mass lay-off, it does not distinguish differences across industries and
States that could in principle be present above this threshold. This is to say that
shocks as identified via peaks in mass layoff might indeed differ across states and
industries in intensity and actual labor market consequences in ways we cannot
control for.
Furthermore, while selection as a function of polygenic score might happen in
a non mutually exclusive way both for geographical location and industry, in
our framework it seems reasonable to say that the most salient channel would
be selection into industry. In a time frame surrounding the Great Recession, the
propagation of negative macro economic conditions, and so mass lay-off, would
first happen at industry level rather than geography. Interestingly, as we will see
in the following of the study we do find evidence of selection into industry which
nevertheless, does not seem to be a driver of our result.
Another significant aspect that we should take into account for the interpretation
of the results is the definition of unemployment. As mentioned above, the outcome
of the models from (3) to (6) is self-reported unemployment at time of the interview.
This should rise two concerns: on the one hand it neglects other important possible
outcomes of late working age such as early retirement or disability; on the other
hand it overlooks what happens in between two waves. Since individuals are
interviewed approximately every two years, using self-declared unemployment
status does not tell a complete story of what happened in between two subsequent
interviews. In fact, a worker might well go unemployed for few months and then
find a new job before the next interview, or use unemployment as a corridor for
retirement.
For the sake of the first point we not only look at unemployment but rather
we turn also to broader changes in working status, considering as outcomes for
alternative specifications having experienced any change in working status and
going out of the labor force, with the latter being defined as either self-declared
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retired or self-declared disabled. In general one would expect both education and
polygenic score to be protective against being affected by negative labor market
shocks but being affected by such shock could mean different things for different
workers. While one might expect genetic predisposition to educational attainment
(being associated with predisposition to accumulate human capital beyond formal
education) to be protective with respect to unemployment, then same might not
hold true, for example, with early retirement. For example, factors not necessarily
related to polygenic scores such as contribution years could in fact play a role
in the decision of taking the chance to retire when a recession or a mass lay-off
knocks at the door. Along this line, to the extent to which contribution years are
related to, for example, to formal education this would turn out to be the only
protective characteristics in this case. As we will see this seems to be the case as it
is expectable that individuals with less educational achievements entered earlier
on in the labor force keeping age constant. This would mean that as a labor market
shock kicks in these individuals could be more likely to accept early retirement
agreement to accommodate firm’s contingent needs.
With regard to the second point mentioned just above we propose robustness tests
looking at a more encompassing definition of unemployment. Rather than looking
at self reported unemployment status, we take into account the receipt of unem-
ployment benefit claims in the last calendar year as a proxy for unemployment.
Yet, since the question is only limited to the last calendar year we still are not able
to get a complete picture of the entire two years before the interview. Nevertheless
this allows us to capture a significant larger amount job losses. Note that we do
not adopt such a definition of unemployment for the main set of results because it
would not be consistent with the other set of job market outcomes we investigate.
In case of significant protective effect of the polygenic score in the main set of
results, another crucial problem to be addressed would be the channel through
which this relation is actually working. As our interviews are carried out every
two years one could think of individuals with higher polygenic score to be either
less likely to loose job when a shock hits the State-industry pair or, alternative,
even if displaced with the same likelihood, they might be more likely to find
re-employment before the next interview. while we are aware that our setting is
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not the perfect one to disentangle these two cases we propose a specification that
goes in the direction of providing at least some suggestive evidence.
Wit = β0 + β1JLit + β2Xit
+ β3HighPGSi ∗ JLit
+ β4Collegei ∗ JLit
+ ai +λt + ρd + ηs + εit
(1.7)
Equation (7) is very similar to equation (6) except that for two aspects. First
of all, rather than modelling the probability of unemployment as self- reported
unemployment status we build a Wit: a dichotomous variable taking value one if
in between two subsequent waves an individual has received some unemployment
benefit but, by the time of the following interview he/she reported to be either
employed of self-employed. This, rather than adopting a broader definition
of unemployment means to focus on those cases in which workers did in fact
experienced some unemployment (which is proxied by receiving unemployment
benefit) but where able to find another job before the next wave. The second
difference is that rather than regressing the outcome on a measure of labor market
shock we regress it on a dummy for having lost the job in between two subsequent
waves and interact it with the usual dummy for a polygenic score beyond one
standard deviation and one for college degree. Notice that in equation (7), β1 is
by construction heavily correlated with the outcome Wit which is in fact build
as an intersection of individuals who have lost their job in between interviews
(according toJLit) but who have a job at the time of the interview. So, while in (7)
the significance of β1 would not be an interesting result, what we aim to test is
in fact the significance of beta3. In fact, the significance of the coefficient of the
interaction betweenHighPGSi and JLit would provide at least suggestive evidence
of the polygenic score being protective against unemployment not only by making
job loss less probable but also by increasing the probability of re-employment
after a job loss.
To test against the possibility that our results are a product of the particular way
we identify the labor market shock measures or the point in which we set the
threshold of the polygenic score dummy, we propose a robustness based on county
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level unemployment rate and non-dichotomized polygenic score for educational
attainment.
1.6 Results
Table 1.3 presents estimates as from model (6) for changing working status, going
out of the labor force, and going unemployed. Starting from the whole sample,
we see that experiencing a peak of mass lay-off in between two subsequent waves
increases the probability of experiencing a general change in the working status
by 3.6%. The interaction between the shock and the dummy for a high polygenic
score has the negative expected sign but it is not statistically significant. On
the other hand, the interaction with the college degree has negative expected
sign and it is statistically significant describing a decrease in the probability
of changing working status of about 7%. To see what is hidden behind this
change of working status we distinguish between going out of the labor force
(i.e. retirement or disability8) and going unemployed. Looking at the second and
third column of the top panel in Table 1.3 we see an interesting pattern. The
coefficient for experiencing a peak in mass lay-off is, if anything, only barely
significant in the model for unemployment; its interaction with the polygenic
score dummy is significant with negative expected sign only for unemployment
while the interaction with the college degree dummmy is only significant in the
model for exiting the labor force.
While the limited significance of the non interacted shock measure is not per se
a concern, the alternative significance of the polygenic score and college degree
in the last two specifications needs further interpretation. Moreover, one would
expect formal education to be negatively associated with unemployment when
hit by a negative labor market shock. The estimates suggest that workers with
a college degree are less likely to exit the labor force when exposed to a labor
market shock. In fact, as a worker become older his/her contribution years (and/or
savings) increase and the sooner a worker entered the labor force, the more likely
8While we are aware that suffering a certain degree of disability per se does not preclude
employment, we use the self-reported disability status as alternative to the employed self-employed
one to assume the exit from the labor market due to disability. Moreover, we grouped it with
retirement to acknowledge the known channel of early retirement through disability benefit.
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he/she will be to retire before 65 years of age. It is straightforward that since the
workers with a college degree entered later on into the labor force with respect to
those without college degree, the former will be less likely to be ready to take the
chance to retire when exposed to negative labor market conditions in the 50 to 65
age range. If this is true then, it comes with no surprise that the interaction with
formal education does not have any effect on the probability of unemployment
while, the only significant interaction for individuals remaining in the labor
market is that with the polygenic score. In other words, as workers experience
a negative labor market shock, those with lower educational attainment, being
entered erlier on in the labor market, will be more likely to exit the labor market
and retire. On the other hand, those with higher educational attainment will more
likely seek to remain in the labor force as they entered it later on in their life. If
in this setting of older workers educational attainment is mainly associated with
lower chances of retirement, having a polygenic score beyond one is associated
with lower chances of unemployment. Finally, it should be noted that while the
R2 in the models for change in working status and exit from the labor force are
respectively 26% and 28%, in the model for unemployment the goodness of fit
remains at 6%.
Following Papageorge and Thom (2019) we further split the sample by gender
in order to acknowledge possible different selection paths into education and/or
labor market which are likely to be present for the cohorts under consideration. It
is worth noticing that in contrast to the above mentioned authors, for the sake of
completeness we decide to include women in the analysis sample. The resulting
estimates are reported in the middle and bottom panel of Table 3. It emerges quite
clearly that the pattern observed in the whole sample is heavily driven by men. In
the middle panel we see the lack of significance and almost zero point estimates
for the mass lay-off shock along every scenario of analysis. The interaction with
the polygenic score dummy remain insignificant while the one with college degree
is significant and with expected sign only in the model for exiting the labor
force. In the case of male workers instead, experiencing a labor market shock is
associated with a 7.1% increase in the probability of general change in the working
status. When the shock is suffered by an individual with a polygenic score greater
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than one, this probability decreases by 8% while the change in probability for
an individual with college degree decreases by 8.5%. With regard to exiting the
labor force, as for the previous two cases, only the interaction with college degree
is significant with a point estimate of -7.6%. More interestingly, looking at the
estimates for unemployment, the statistical significance is stronger if compared
with the panels above and experiencing a shock in the labor market in between two
subsequent waves is associated with an increased probability of unemployment
of about 3.9% while, this probability decreases by 6.2% if the worker has a high
polygenic score for educational attainment. As for the other cases, no significant
association is detected for the interaction with college degree. Notice that the
point estimate for the interaction with the polygenic score more than offset the
estimate of the coefficient for the shock alone.
As mentioned in the methodological section of the study, so far we have been
considering only job status at time of interview which happens every two year.
For this reason we might be losing track change of working status that happens
and resolve within the same waves. This is to say that while we show that at least
for male workers having a high polygenic score is associated with lower chances
of being re-interviewed while unemployed, it says little of weather this is due to
lower chances actually experiencing unemployment in the first place or also higher
chances of finding an employment once again after being displaced. To dig deeper
in this direction we exploit a proxy to detect the experiencing of unemployment
status disregarding the actual job status at the time of the interview that is having
received any unemployment benefit during last calendar year.
The first three columns of Table 1.4 reports estimates results for linear probability
models for having experienced some unemployment as proxied by unemploy-
ment benefit receipt. Here we see a very similar pattern as in Table 1.3 with the
interaction between the shock and the dummy for high polygenic score being
significant with comparable size effect as in Table 1.3. The last three columns of
Table 1.4 instead report estimate for the model described by equation (7) where
the dependent variable is a dummy for having experienced unemployment and
having found another job in between the same two waves. In these columns
we focus on experiencing unemployment as main variable of interest to build
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Table 1.3: Fixed effect linear probability model for labor market outcomes and
mass lay-off events
Whole Sample
Changed working status Out of the labour force Unemployment
Post.PeakML 0.036** 0.019 0.015*
(0.017) (0.015) (0.009)
Post.PeakML * HighPGS -0.013 -0.006 -0.033**
(0.030) (0.027) (0.012)
Post.PeakML * College -0.069*** -0.061*** 0.005
(0.023) (0.022) (0.011)
constant 11.823*** 13.254*** -1.045**
(1.149) (1.060) (0.531)
N 8499 8499 8499
R2 0.26 0.28 0.06
Women
Post.PeakML 0.008 -0.003 0.002
(0.022) (0.019) (0.011)
Post.PeakML * HighPGS -0.016 0.030 -0.022
(0.040) (0.036) (0.018)
Post.PeakML * College -0.073** -0.060** 0.016
(0.035) (0.033) (0.017)
constant 10.137*** 11.829*** -1.398*
(1.495) (1.371) (0.643)
N 4850 4850 4850
R2 0.27 0.30 0.08
Men
Post.PeakML 0.071*** 0.038 0.039***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.013)
Post.PeakML * HighPGS -0.080* -0.036 -0.062***
(0.048) (0.043) (0.016)
Post.PeakML * College -0.085*** -0.076** -0.008
(0.034) (0.032) (0.015)
constant 15.011*** 15.254*** -0.011
(1.877) (1.783) (1.004)
N 3649 3649 3649
R2 0.29 0.31 0.09
Note: all specifications include the following controls: time dummies, marital status, age, age
squared, number of children, a dummy for ever being diagnosed with diabetes, industry dummies,
state dummies, income (all source) and tenure with last employer or job.
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Table 1.4: Fixed effect linear probability model for experiencing unemployment





W & M W M W & M W M
Post.PeakML 0.025* 0.021 0.032
(0.014) (0.017) (0.023)
Post.PeakML * HighPGS -0.038* -0.021 -0.079***
(0.021) (0.029) (0.030)
Post.PeakML * College -0.010 -0.018 0.000
(0.018) (0.026) (0.025)
Experiencing unemployment 0.497*** 0.510*** 0.480***
(0.030) 0.041) (0.045)
Experiencing unemployment * HighPGS 0.068 -0.046 0.253**
(0.071) (0.089) (0.104)
experiencing unemployment * College -0.033 0.010 -0.118
(0.058) (0.075) (0.089)
constant -1.167 -0.924 -1.216 0.308 0.766 -0.800
(0.736) (0.924) (1.408) (0,396) (0.469) (0.727)
N 8499 4850 3649 8499 4850 3649
R2 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.48 0.50 0.50
Note: all specifications include the following controls: time dummies, marital status, age, age
squared, number of children, a dummy for ever being diagnosed with diabetes, industry dummies,
state dummies, income (all source) and tenure with last employer or job.
the interaction. As mentioned in the methodological section, the non-interacted
variable for experiencing unemployment is significant by construction throughout
the different sample split as it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the
dependent variable to be equal to one. On the other hand, what we are really
interested in is, one again, its interaction with the polygenic score dummy. As
the reader can see at least for male individual, such interaction has sizeable and
significant coefficient with positive sign, suggesting that even when experiencing
unemployment, individuals with above one polygenic scoreare statistically more
likely to find another job by the time they are interview in the following wave. On
the other hand estimates remain difficult to interpret for women.
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1.6.1 Robustness
As first set of robustness, in Table 1.5 we repeat the main analysis using data
on the unemployment benefit claims as a measure of labor market shock. As
already mentioned there is no reason to expect these data to be less than highly
correlated with mass lay-off but nevertheless they capture dynamics of the labor
market at level of single workers rather than firms, as it is in the case of statistics
on mass lay-off events. Overall, in terms of point estimates results seem be in
line with those obtained with mass lay-offs. The biggest difference is given by
the interaction between the shock and the polygenic score dummy showing some
limited statistical significance also in the the model for men exiting the labor
force. With regard to unemployment robustness confirm the significance of the
coefficient for the interaction term with similar point estimates, even though in
this case the non interacted shock measure shows a non significance coefficient
also for the men sample split.
As a second set of robustness we address possible concerns towards the study
design in relation to the splitting of the sample on the basis of some discretionary
value of the polygenic score as well as the identification of shocks in the labor
market. To be more explicit, one may argue that results are purely a function of
the way the working sample is split with regard to the polygenic score. While
splitting the sample at one standard deviation is quite a common practice in many
gene environment interaction studies which are mostly characterized by statistical
power issues and tiny effects (e.g. Domingue et al. (2017) it is nevertheless fair
to address such a concern. Moreover, another possible concern relates to the
environmental shock as some may look at the way we identify the labor market
shocks as too discretionary as well. In Table 1.6 we address both these concerns
by estimating linear probability models for changing working status, exiting the
labor force and self-declared unemployment at time of interview as a function
county level unemployment rate and its interaction with the polygenic score for
educational attainment as continuous measure and an interaction with years of
schooling. In this way we are actually ruling out the above mentioned concerns
all at once while still exploiting the panel dimension of our dataset. Notice that
the Bueau of Labor Statistics only provide access to county level unemployment
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Table 1.5: Fixed effect linear probability model for labor market outcomes and
initial unemployment benefit claims events
Changed working status Out of the labour force Unemployment
Women
Post.PeakUBC 0.029 0.006 0.013
(0.022) (0.019) (0.010)
Post.PeakUBC * HighPGS -0.002 0.015 -0.013
(0.042) (0.035) (0.023)
Post.PeakUBC * College -0.058* -0.060** 0.023
(0.034) (0.033) (0.017)
constant 10.146*** 11.884*** -1.365**
(1.494) (1.368) (0.643)
N 4850 4850 4850
R2 0.27 0.30 0.08
Men
Post.PeakUBC 0.059** 0.045** 0.014
(0.027) (0.024) (0.013)
Post.PeakUBC *HighPGS -0.094** -0.066* -0.044***
(0.042) (0.075) (0.015)
Post.PeakUBC * College -0.078** -0.075*** -0.004
(0.034) (0.032) (0.015)
constant 14.992*** 15.294*** -0.063
(1.883) (1.790) (1.001)
N 3649 3649 3649
R2 0.29 0.31 0.08
Note: all specifications include the following controls: time dummies, marital status, age, age
squared, number of children, a dummy for ever being diagnosed with diabetes, industry dummies,
state dummies, income (all source) and tenure with last employer or job.
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rate as yearly data. In this sense, with respect to the main set of results, we are
on the one hand gaining geographical variation while on the other hand we are
losing time variability.
Starting from column (a) of Table 1.6 we have a coefficient for county level unem-
ployment of 0.812 which is, not surprisingly, highly significant as we are using
the change in unemployment rate in the county of residence between two wave
to predict the entering into unemployment of a single individual living in that
very same area. As county level unemployment is in percentage points, one would
expect its coefficient to be very close to one while, in our case the coefficient is
appreciably below it. This is most likely due to the fact that while county level
unemployment refers to the whole labor market, in this study we restrict to indi-
viduals with 50 to 65 years of age. A below average unemployment rate for such
cohort would then explain such a deviation from the expected point estimate of
the coefficient.
Introducing in the specification the interaction terms we in columns (b) to (d),
we obtain a significance pattern which is closely resembles that of Table 1.3 and
Table 1.5. The interaction terms in the model for changing working statu are
both significant and with expected negative sign. With regard to the modelfor
exiting the labor force the interaction with the polygenic score loses significance
while the significant ne is the one for educational attainment. Lastly and most
interestingly for us, in the model for unemployment (column (c)) the interaction
with the polygenic score is significant with sizeable point estimates if compared
the coefficient of county level unemployment itself. Such remarkable similarity
with the main set of results is extremely promising in coping with the possible
concerns highlighted just above.
As anticipated in Section 5 an important aspect to consider with regard to the
interpretation of the results is possible selection into exposure to labor market
shocks driven by the polygenic score itself. To asses whether this could be is
indeed an issue we plot in Figure 1.5 the average polygenic score by industry
with a 95% confidence interval. We document a surprisingly evident degree of
selection into industry. In our working sample the polygenic score is on average
below zero for workers in industries like utilities, accommodation, construction,
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Table 1.6: Fixed effect linear probability model for labor market outcomes over









(a) (b) (c) (d)
County UR 0.812*** 5.582*** 3.677** 1.263*
(0.093) (1.352) (1.236) (0.683)
County UR * PGS_EA -0.401** -0.245 -0.224**
(0.199) (0.182) (0.100)
County UR * EA -0.374*** -0.242** -0.075
(0.091) (0.082) (0.046)
Constant -0,031*** 12.280*** 13.219*** -0.836*
(0,006) (1.157) (1.064) (0.469)
N 8499 8499 8499 8499
R2 0.02 0.28 0.29 0.08
Note: County level unemployment are yearly average. All specifications include the following
controls: time dummies, marital status, age, age squared, number of children, a dummy for ever
being diagnosed with diabetes, industry dummies, state dummies, income (all source) and tenure
with last employer or job.
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Figure 1.5: Polygenic score for educational attainment by industry of occupation.
HRS waves 2006 - 2014.
retail and manufacturing. On the other hand, industries like health services,
finance, professional services, education, public administration and agriculture
have average polygenic score above zero. With the exception of the latter one, the
resulting ranking is somehow close to what one could expect, with workers having
below average score employed in sectors where the labor market is typically more
volatile or where temporary or low skill jobs are more present. On the other
hand it is worth noting that such pattern might reflect, at least to some degree,
intergenerational persistence of occupational choices within families.
To the extent to which the belonging to an industry as function of the polygenic
score determines in the State-industry pairs a systematic pattern of exposure to
labor market shocks, our estimates could in fact reflect such a selection rather
than any protective effect. While there is no perfect way to test against this, in
Table 1.7 we report estimated results of OLS models where the polygenic score
and a dummy for a score above 1 (as used in Table 1.3 to 1.5) are alternatively
regressed on the shock measure and a dummy for being exposed to a shock at
some point. This, controlling education and all the usual controls used throughout
43
the paper. Estimates show that conditionally on educational attainment or college
degree and all the other controls (including States and industry dummies) our
labor market shock measure do not significantly correlate with the polygenic score
or a dichotomous transformation of it. This is sound evidence that, despite the
documented non negligible degree of selection in industries, our results can not
anyhow driven by correlation between our measures of labor market shocks and
the polygenic score.
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Table 1.7: OLS for polygenic score over labor market shock measures.
PGS for educational attainment
Post.PeakML 0.016 0.009
(0.040) (0.040)




Educational attainment 0.119*** 0.118****
(0.011) (0.011)
Constant 3.184 2.329 3.443 2.495
(2.147) (2.119) (2.142) (2.115)
N 9216 9216 9216 9216








Educational attainment 0.034*** 0.034***
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.168 -0.141 0.239 -0.094
(0.792) (0.790) (0.793) (0.792)
N 9216 9216 9216 9216
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Note: all specifications include the following controls: time dummies, marital status, age, age
squared, number of children, a dummy for ever being diagnosed with diabetes, industry dummies,
state dummies, income (all source) and tenure with last employer or job.
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1.7 Discussion
Results highlight a lower probability of unemployment after being exposed to
a negative labor market shock for individuals with polygenic score above one
standard deviation. For male workers the decrease in probability is significant and
between 4.4% and 6.2% depending on whether labor market shocks are measured
with unemployment benefit claims or mass lay-offs. For women the decrease is
estimated between 1.3% and 2.2% but it does not reach statistical significance. The
lack of a significant estimated coefficient for the interaction term among female
workers is consistent with previous studies from the same literature disregarding
such group because of systematic selection patterns into education and labor force
for specific cohorts.
Results are consistent with an interpretation of the polygenic score for educational
attainment that goes beyond simple predisposition for education. In fact also
in our study, the polygenic score remain significant and predictive of outcome
observed
On the other hand, it is worth remembering that mainly for reasons of constraint
in data availability rooted in the current developmental stage of genomic science
we are using a considerably selected sample that limits the external validity of our
results as well as possible policy implication.
1.8 Conclusion
In this study we provided evidence of interaction between individual level genetic
information on predisposition to educational attainment and labor market data
in predicting labor market outcomes in later working life. After controlling
for education, a polygenic score above 1 implies a 4.4 to 6.2% decrease in the
probability of unemployment when exposed to a negative labor market shock
as measured via unemployment benefit claims or mass lay-off respectively. On
the other hand, no significant interaction is found for women. Education plays a
role only with respect to transitioning out of the labor force when exposed to a
labor market shock. Results are robust to alternative definitions of environmental
shocks and unemployment. Furthermore, we present suggestive evidence of high
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polygenic score decreasing the probability of unemployment both via decreasing
the probability of losing the job in the first place and via increasing probability of
re-employment after a job loss. We document a non negligible degree of selection
into industries as function of the polygenic score with lower average polygenic
scores concentrated in more volatile sectors or sectors in which is traditionally
more likely to observe temporary job contracts. Nevertheless, such selection is
unable to explain our results as after considering all the available controls, the
polygenic score is not significantly correlated with the exposure to our measure of




Estimating the Causal Effect of Retirement on
Frailty
Abstract
In this study we estimate the causal effect of retirement on frailty, a syndrome
defined as a multi-systemic health deficit accumulation with good predictive
properties with respect negative health outcomes like further health decline,
dependency and death. We use data from the Survey on Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), instrumenting retirement with the reaching of
early and statutory retirement eligibility criteria in nine countries. Exploiting
the panel structure of the dataset we are able to exploit both cross and within
country variation in such criteria. Results highlight a significant protective effect
of retirement among male retirees. Results are robust to alternative definitions of
retirement and to partial definitions of the frailty index.
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2.1 Introduction
Ageing represents one of the many challenges that both developed and developing
countries will face in the next decades. To give a sense of the magnitude of the
phenomenon, for European countries, old-age dependency ratio (the share of
people 65 and older over the population in the 18-65 age range) is expected to
increase from less than 30 percent in 2015 to more than 50 percent by 2050 while
countries such as Greece, Portugal and Italy are expected to reach respectively 70,
65 and 62 percent (Eurostat 2015). This, in addition to increased life expectancy,
poses a number of question both regarding quality of life and sustainability of the
healthcare sector.
In such a context, frailty represents a central aspect in describing the health de-
cline of an elder individual, with considerable documented consequences for the
healthcare system (Comans et al. (2016), Bock et al. (2016)). Frailty is a clinical
syndrome entailing a vulnerable health status resulting from a multisystem reduc-
tion in older people’s health capacity or physiological reserve (Fried et al. (2001),
Staudinger et al. (1995),Lally and Crome (2007),Theou et al. (2015), Harttgen et al.
(2013)). A frail individual is affected by a pathological multisystemic syndrome
different from aging itself (meant as "chronological" ageing), stemming from both
genetic (Viña et al. (2016), Inglés et al. (2019)) and environmental stressor factors
(Fried et al. (2001), Staudinger et al. (1995) and Roiland et al. (2015)).
A common definition of such a concept in the applied literature is the one by Fried
et al. (2001). As pointed out by Sirven (2012), it is mainly because of its distinction
from disability and comorbidity, the easily implemntable operationalization and,
finally, its parsimony. In Fried et al. (2001), the definition of frailty relies on only
five dymensions: weakness, exhaustion, slowness, low physical activity levels and
shrinking. A frailty index going from zero to five synthetize into a single measure
the realized status.1 The aim of the present study is to identify the causal effect of
1A valuable alternative to Fried et al. (2001) is the definition of frailty given by Rockwood et al.
(2007) which although being extremely encompassing (it is measured over about 70 variables
covering also cognitive changes, attitudes and behavioural risks in addition to physiologic status)
it is hardly implementable without a professional health assessment.
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retirement on frailty as an important outcome for the health trajectory in old age
population.
2.2 Literature
From a theoretical standpoint frailty has already been introduced by Strulik (2015)
in the economic literature as a model of ageing and longevity which highlight the
role of deficit accomulation as opposed to that of health capital accumulation as
in Grossman (1972) and most of the following literature in health economics.
The relevance of frailty in both geronthological medicine and social sciences is
due to its predictive power with respect to disability and health outcomes in
general such as dependence, falls and finally death (Bergman et al. (2007)) as
well as to the opportunity for early detection and reversibility (Fried et al. (2004)).
In addition, as anticipated above, letting aside the epidemilogical and medical
realm of interest, recent studies found positive association between frailty and
healthcare costs (Bock et al. (2016), Comans et al. (2016), Sirven and Rapp (2016)).
Interestingly, the latter seem to be driven by a combination of disabilities, chronic
conditions and frailty. This contrast the belief that age is the main driver of
healthcare cost among elderly population. Bock et al. (2016) provide evidence of
how frailty is associated with increased health care costs and highlight frailty as
one of the main factor for healthcare costs independently from pure age. Overall
thi indicates how the overlapping concepts of multimorbidity and frailty are
necessary to explain health care use and corresponding costs among older adults.
Comans et al. (2016) analyze the cost of frailty by comparing, on the basis of
resource use data, patient cohorts respectively entering a community-based post-
acute program and entering residential care. Findings confirm association between
pre-frailty and frailty statuses and increase in healthcare costs. Finally, Sirven and
Rapp (2016) investigate the incremental cost of frailty with respect to ambulatory
health care expenditures in the 65 and older French population in 2012. Findings
suggest frailty’s significant additional explanatory power toward expenditures
whatever other health covariates are considered, meaning that frailty can indeed
represent a source of omitted variable bias whenever it is not accounted for.
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In addition to purely financially driven concerns, recent studies in gerontology
and aging such as Woods et al. (2013) or Ruan et al. (2015) highlighted the link
between physiological reserve and cognitive decline. By this, the authors explicitly
claim the existence of a relationship between what they call physical frailty and
the so called cognitive frailty: "an heterogeneous clinical syndrome of cognitive
impairment that develops in elderly individuals, is caused by physical factors (e.g.,
physical frailty and pre-physical frailty) and is excluded from dementia resulting
from Alzheimer’s disease or other conditions" (Ruan et al. (2015)).
Although being still far from an easily implementable and operationally friendly
definition for cognitive frailty, this proposed link is suggestive of the central
role of physiological functioning in triggering impaired cognitive states. This
seems especially interesting considering the lack of any systematic consideration
for the concept of frailty in the literature on health effects of retirement which
nevertheless investigated some aspects of cognition.
On the other hand, although a not clear causal direction, also cognitive capabilities
characterizing the so called executive functions (EF)2 are expected to play a role
in early stages of pre-frail conditions. In fact, looking for a mediation channel
between EF and frailty, Roiland et al. (2015) propose (cross-sectional) evidence of
stress exposure and regulation function emerging as a significant predictors of
pre-frail condition.
Retirement is recognized as a delicate transition period and many studies already
attempted to assess its effect on a number of health outcomes. For studies regard-
ing non physically related outcomes of retirement, the main variable of interest
have so far been depression (Charles (2002), Belloni et al. (2016)) and cognitive
functioning (Coe and Zamarro (2011), Coe et al. (2012), Mosca (2017)) highlight-
ing mixed results.
With regard to physical health, Coe and Zamarro (2011) also looked at general
health predicting self reported health status over serveral objective measures of
health such as the number of hospitalizations in the last year, obesity, the number
2For a comprehensive analysis and definition of Executive Functions please, refer to Diamond
(2014)
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of chronic diseases and mobility limitations. 3 On the other hand, outcomes such
as cholesterol and blood pressure (Behncke (2012)) as well as BMI (Godard (2016))
have also been directly investigated highlighting positive effects of retirement
on these outcomes. The most closely related paper to the present one is Bertoni
et al. (2018) where the authors assess the causal effect of retirement on the loss
of muscle strength, an important component of frailty. Findings point to a short
term protective effect of retirement on grip strength but do not consider frailty as
a systemic concept in the health of retirees.
Despite a quite extensive literature, most of the empirical literature on retire-
ment and health has so far mainly addressed short term effects while long term
ones remain an overlooked question(Avendano and Berkman, 2014). With this
regard, investigating the first stages of deficit accumulation in the aging process
as described by a frailty score, would allow to shed some light on the long term
effects. To the best of our knowledge only few studies investigate the socioeco-
nomic aspects determining frailty (Sirven (2012), Lu et al. (2017) and Kalousova
and de Leon (2015)) and even though they seem to point in the direction of the
presence of socio-economic gradient Sirven (2012), correlation with employment
histories Lu et al. (2017) and psychosocial working condition on the job Kal-
ousova and de Leon (2015), all the three studies fail to give any particular causal
interpretation.
Using panel and retrospective data from SHARE accross three waves, Sirven (2012)
investigates the determinants of frailty by mean of a Fixed Effect Poisson and
Mundlak Random Effect model highlighting the presence of an income gradient
having positive effects on frailty and a positive effect given by social capital. On
the other hand, the study highlights higher frailty associated to being in the labour
force. Interestingly, this seems counter-intuitive with respect to the so called
Healthy Worker Effect (the selection into retirement of the weaker/ill workers and
a consequent healthier remaining labour force) leading the reader to question
whether retirement could represent (for some worker) a valuable preventive
measure for the considered health outcome.
3More on this in Figure 1.1.
53
Kalousova and de Leon (2015) using wave I and wave IV in a multilevel linear
model framework found that working in a position with high effort and low
reward predicts the greater increase in frailty while also "effort-to-control" ratio is
associated with increased level of frailty. With respect to retirement the authors
report a negative effect (decrease in frailty) associated with retiring from working
positions with low reward.
Finally, using data from ELSA with multilevel models, Lu et al. (2017) found lower
levels of frailty among women who experienced distinct periods of work and
family care over the life course. On the other hand, among men, retiring before 65
seems beneficial for slowing down frailty trajectories.
2.3 Data
We use data from the Release 6 of the last three waves (2011, 2013 and 2015) of the
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), a multidisciplinary
and cross-national panel database with individual information on health, socio-
economic status as well as social and family networks. To date, SHARE collected
more than 120,000 Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) covering 27
European countries and Israel.
Our sample includes all individuals aged 50-65 from nine European countries
(Austria, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, Belgium, Czech Republic, and
Estonia), who were working at baseline and who declared in each wave to be
either retired or employed. Thus, we only consider transitions to retirement from
employment, neglecting other possible paths such as through unemployment or
disability. Moreover, we drop respondents for whom variables needed for the
computation of our frailty index are missing as well as respondents with missing
values for covariates in our final specification.
2.3.1 Defining Frailty
From an operational perspective, we define frailty on the basis of the frail phen-
otype definition proposed in Fried et al. (2001). As mentioned above, the frail
phenotype definition identifies an index going from zero to five according to
the number of markers present for the individual. A frailty index equal to zero
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identifies a fit individual, if the index takes either values of one or two we refer to
a pre-frail individual, while for an index equal to three and more we have a frail
individual.
The five dymensions of the index are: shrinking, exhaustion, low grip strength
(weakness), slowness, and low physical activity. For each of these markers we
define a dummy variable whose activation depend on the following measures and
answer, as in Santos-Eggimann et al. (2009). The dummy for shrinking identifies
individuals reporting a "diminuition in the desire for food" to the question "What
has your appetinte been like?" or "less" to the question "So have you been eatin more or
less than usual?". For exhaustion, the dummy takes value one if a positive reponse
is given to the question "In the last month, have you had too little energy to do things
you wanted to do?". As for grip strength, we attributed a deficit to individuals with
a maximum hand grip strength over four trials below some thresholds depending
on gender and bmi.4 The dummy for slowness takes value one if a positive answer
was give to "Because of a health problem, do you have difficulties walking 100 meters"
or "...climbing one flight of stairs without resting?". Finally, an individual is defined
as carrying out low physical activity if reporting "hardly ever or never" or "one to
three times a month" to the question "How often do you engage in activities requiring
a low or moderate level of energy such as gardening, cleaning the car or going for a
walk?" Overall, this frailty index relies in part on subjective measures of health.
Nevertheless, covering different domains of individuals’ health, the encompassing
and systemic nature of the indicator can rule out, or at the very least attenuate,
concerns regarding justification bias.
To further motivate the study we can compare the frailty index computed as just
described with the health index estimated in Coe and Zamarro (2011). In their
assessment of the effect of retirement on health, the authors predict self-reported
health status going from "excellent" to "poor" with a five point scale over a vector
4For men the cutoff are 29 Kg for a bmi below 24; 30 Kg for a bmi between 24 and 28; 32 Kg for
bmi above 28. For women, thresholds are 17 Kg for a bmi below 23; 17.3 Kg for a bmi between 23
and 26; 18 Kg for a bmi between 26 and 29 and 21 for a bmi above 29 (Fried et al. (2001)). In this
ought to point out that while the measure for grip strength is the only truly objective one that we
can retrieve from our data, the BMI measures on which the thresholds are attributed are in fact
resulting from self declared height and weight.
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Figure 2.1: Frailty vs. Health Index
of objective measure of health including the number of limitations in activities of
the daily living (ADLs), BMI, grip strength, EURO-D depression score, number of
chronic diseases etc.
Figure 2.1 shows a scatter plot with frailty index on the x-axis and the estimated
values of the health index computed as in Coe and Zamarro (2011) on the y-
axis. To begin with, despite exploiting partially overlapping information, the two
measures are only correlated at about 50%. Moreover, looking at Figure 2.1 we
can appreciate how, with respect to the Frailty score, a general health index whose
estimates are obtained on the basis of self reported health as an outcome seems to
overestimate the erosion of health capacity on the fit end of the spectrum while
underestimating it on the other extreme of the distribution.
Given the relatively low age range we consider, the probability of observing a
large share of severely frail individuals is ex-ante rather low. In fact, in the cross
section of our sample only 1.5% of the individuals exhibit three or more markers
contemporaneously while more than 38% (34.4% and 42.5% respectively for
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men and women) exhibit at least a pre-frail status. Therefore, as anticipated
above, considering the systemic nature of the syndrome and so how each marker
represents a risk factor for the others in the path toward frailty, we focus on the
development of pre-frail status. In order to do so we dichotomize the frailty index
between zero and one, identifying the causal effect of retirement on the probability
of being at least in a pre-frail status.
As for retirement, we adopt two distinct definitions, in the attempt to assess the
robustness of the results. A first one, in line with Godard (2016), is solely based on
self-declared status while a second one, further condition on not having done any
paid job during the last four weeks. While self-declared status nicely correlates
with eligibility criteria and receiving pension benefits, not working for pay in the
last four weeks allows to explicitly account for labor supply. A possible problem
with the first definition would be given by individuals declaring themselves retired
because they left the job that mostly characterized their career while eventually
carrying out some other activities.
Table 2.1 describes a sample of 7698 and 7690 pooled observations respectively
for men and women. Retirees are not surprisingly on average older and slightly
less educated which is suggestive of an earlier entry in the labor market. In terms
of socio-economic conditions retiring individuals seem comparable with those
remaining in the labor force. Again,not surprisingly, income is appreciably lower
among retirees and it is worth noting the significant lower averages for women
throughout both groups. In terms of health, the average frailty index seems is
0.46 and 0.56 among retiring men and women respectively against 0.43 and 0.57
among non-retiring male and women. The distribution across fit, pre-frail and
frail statuses is very comparable between the two groups both within male and
female individuals. Figures in Table 2.1 highlight how, for the given range of
age, pre-frail statuses tend to be significantly more common among women then
men and finally, as expected given the age we are considering, frailty conditions
affect only less than 2% of the working sample. Finally, retiring individuals tend
to be more likely to have chronic conditions while the presence of two or more
limitations with daily activities only sightly higher for them as compared to non
retiring individuals. On the same line, also scores on the EURO-D depression
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Age 60.54 62.43 59.42 60.14 61.90 59.17
Years of education 12.76 12.18 13.11 12.72 12.22 13.00
One child 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.18
More than one child 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.58
Retirement 0.19 0.51 0.00 0.18 0.51 0.00
Socio-Economics
MEM very hardly 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07
MEM easily 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.34
Income (1000 €) 16.67 12.20 19.33 11.23 8.09 12.96
Health
Frailty index (0-5) 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.57 0.56 0.57
Fit 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.56 0.57 0.56
Pre-frail 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.42 0.41 0.42
Frail 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
2+ Chronic cond. 0.32 0.35 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.32
2+ LDA 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
EURO-D (0-12) 1.59 1.62 1.57 2.33 2.28 2.36
Country
Austria 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.05
Germany 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.14
Spain 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.08
Italy 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.10
France 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.11
Belgium 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12
Czech Rep 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.10
Slovenia 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
Estonia 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.21 0.27
Note: Retirement across waves refers to self-declared retirement status. MEM stands for "Make
ends meet". LDA stands for "Limitations in activities of daily living". EURO-D represents a
geriatric depression scale going from 0 to 12.
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scale are only marginally higher for retiring workers. Overall Table 2.1 describes
a situation with retiring workers having on average worse health outcomes as
compared to non-retiring individuals. This being said, it does not say anything
regarding any possible change occurring around the time of retirement which is
indeed the aim of the current study.
2.4 Identification Strategy
Endogeneity is a recurrent threat when estimating any effect of retirement. It may
stem from a variety of sources such as omitted variables affecting both retirement
and our dependent variable or reverse causality. In the former case we may think
to omitted unobservable time preference while in the latter we could expect
individuals exhibiting higher frailty indexes being more likely to self select into
early retirement.
A first step toward a causal interpretation of the coefficient of retirement would
be to exploit the panel dimension of our data considering a fixed effect model. In
so doing, we would control for unobserved individual specific constant variables
such as time preferences (assuming them to be constant), allowing explanatory
variable to be endogenous as far as their endogeneity arises from correlation with
unobserved heterogeneity. Still, reverse causality remains a problem. To address
reverse causality we estimate a fixed effect instrumental variable model. By
instrumenting retirement in a fixed effect framework, we are able to both control
for time constant unobserved omitted variables as well as reverse causality.5
As for the majority of studies using SHARE data, we rely on instruments based
on retirement age thresholds such as in Coe and Zamarro (2011),Mazzonna et al.
(2014) andGodard (2016). The main intuition underlying this approach is to
exploit discontinuities in the probability to retire around country-specific eligiblity
ages. This is to say that we rely on the fact that, as showed by Gruber et al. (1999),
5The choice to model individual time constant heterogeneity through a fixed effect rather than
a random effect is driven by Hausman test leading to reject the null hypothesis of no systematic
difference between the coefficient under the two models with a p-value of 0.044. Using a fixed
effect also allows us to exploit functionalities of the xtivreg2 Stata package like standard errors
clustered at individual level and tests for the validity of the instrumental variables.
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individuals seem to be willing to retire as soon as possible given their country’s
retirement rules. Such age thresholds can be easily demonstrated to be relevant
in workers’ decision to retire and at the same time seem arguably exogenous. We
define early retirement age (ERA) as the earliest age - conditional on contribution
years - at which individuals are entitled to reduce pension benefits while ordinary
retirement eligibility age (ORA) is the earliest age at which workers are entitled to
full old-age pension, regardless of contribution history.
Our main model of interest is:
P r(Yit = 1|Rit,xit, ai ,λt) = β0 + β1Rit +γ
′
xit + ai +λt + εit (2.1)
where Yit is bivariate variable for being at least in a pre-frail status for individual
i at time t; Rit is a dummy identifying the retirement status; xit is a vector of time
varying characteristics; ai is an individual fixed effect while λt represents a time
dummy and εit an error term.
We instrument the retirement status Rit with two variables defined as:
Zict = 1{ageit≥ERAct} (2.2)
Wict = 1{ageit≥ORAct} (2.3)
Therefore, Zict and Wict are two dummies describing the eligibility to either
early or normal retirement as a function of individuals’ age and country-specific
eligibility rules at time t. It follows a first stage of the kind:
P r(Rit = 1|Zict,Wict,xit, ai ,λt) = α0 +α1Zict +α2Wict + η
′
xit + ai +λt + εit (2.4)
where in addition to the instrument just described we have the set of covariates
xit as in equation (1) as well as the individual fixed effect ai , a time dummy λt and
the error term εit.
With regard to our instruments, having information on workers from nine coun-
tries and three waves, we rely both on cross-country variation in retirement
eligibility rules as well as on within country variation. As a matter of fact, in
our sample, every country exhibit a shift in at least one eligibility criteria for
retirement for either men or women. Interestingly, in contrast to the majority of
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study on this matter that exploit upward variations in retirement age as seen in
many European countries in the last fifteen years, our framework allows to exploit
a rather unique downward shift in eligibility criteria for normal retirement in
Germany in 2015.
As reported in Table 2.2, each country in the panel faced some sort of change in
retirement eligibility rule. For some of them the change is due to reforms meant
to ensure long-run financial stability such as for Italy, in other cases instead, we
see more subtle shifts reflecting adjustments to life expectancy like for Czech
Republic or adjustment to target ages defined by law before 2011.
In the case of Italy for example, the statutory retirement age for men passed
from 65 to 66 regardless of the working sector. On the other hand, the statutory
retirement age for women changed as function of the working sector getting
from 60 to 66 years old for public sector workers, to 63 for self-employed and
to 62 for private sector employees. Finally, with respect to early retirement, age
requirement passed from 60 to 62 (OECD (2011), OECD (2013b), OECD (2015)).6
On the other hand, in Germany statutory retirment age was set to 65 years old
in 2011 provided an increasing path reaching 67 in twenty years from 2012. In
addition, with an insurance record of at least 35 years7, early retirement was
allowed at 63 years old with a permanent benefit reduction of 3.6% per year of
early retirement (OECD (2011) OECD (2013a)). Effectively from July 1st 2014,
both male and female German workers with an insured working life of 45 years
who were born before 01/01/1953 can retire at 63 years old without any reduction
of the pension benefits. Such a threshold is increased by 2 months for each year of
birth after 1952 (OECD (2015)). Considering the time span in our analysis this
change would affect three cohorts: from 1950 to 1952.
6No benefits reduction for early retirement with 42 years and one months and 41 years and
one months of contribution respectively for men and women. Early retirement regardless of the
contribution period triggers a 1% payments reduction for each year of early retirement up to 60
years old and a 2% reduction per year if retirement occurs before 60 years old. For individuals
under the contributive and mixed system with twenty years of contribution the early retirement
age is instead 63.
7Insured time from employment, child care and child raising periods up to age 10 or periods of
short unemployment (OECD (2015))
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Table 2.2: Early and normal retirement age
Early retirement age (ERA)
Males Females
Country Wave Wave
2011 2013 2015 2011 2013 2015
Austria 62 62 62 57 58.6 59.3
Germany 63 63 63 63 63 63
Spain 60 / 61 60 / 63 60 / 63 60 / 61 60 / 63 60 / 63
Italy 60 / 61 62 62 60 / 61 62 62
France 59 60 60 59 60 60
Belgium 60 60.5 61.5 60 60.5 61.5
Czech Rep 59.3 59.5 59.8 59.6 60.3 61
Slovenia 58 60 60 58 60 60
Estonia 60 60 60 58.5 59 59.5
Ordinary Retirement Age (ORA)
Males Females
Country Wave Wave
2011 2013 2015 2011 2013 2015
Austria 65 65 65 60 60 60
Germany 65 65 65 / 63 65 65 65 / 63
Spain 65 65 65 65 65 65
Italy 65 66 66 60 62 / 63 / 66 63 / 64 / 66
France 65 65 66 65 65 66
Belgium 65 65 65 65 65 65
Czech Rep 62.3 62.5 62.8 60.6 61.3 62
Slovenia 58 58 58,6 56 57.3 58.3
Estonia 63 63 63 61.5 62 62.5
Source: OECD (2011-2015) and MISSOC (2011-2015)
62
For our instruments to be valid, they need not only to be relevant for retirement
decisions but also exogenous, that is, related with the outcome of interest only
through retirement. In this regard, a threat to our identification could be given
by possible systematic discontinuities in workers’ health at their countries’ early
and ordinary retirement ages. However, considering the cross and within country
variation for ERA and ORA, this seems highly unlikely. For men, the lowest
considered retirement age is 58 years while the highest arrives to 66 years. For
women, the range of retirement ages goes instead from 57 to 66. Therefore we are
able to estimate the effect of retirement over a considerable range of ages for both
genders.8
As reported in Table 2.3, looking at the cross-sectional dymension of our sample
in column 1, on average 37% of the individuals retired during the considered
years. Columns 2-5 exploit instead the panel dymension of our sample to describe
respectively the share of workers becoming eligible for early retirement and
ordinary retirement (columns 2-3) as well as the share of individuals who become
eligible in between two waves and decide to retire in between the same two
waves (columns 4-5). Overall, more than 64% of workers who became eligible
for ordinary retirement decided to retire in between the same two waves while,
only 36% of individuals who became eligible for early retirement decided to retire
in between the same waves. This seems suggestive of workers considering less
the early retirement age threshold as compared to the normal retirement age in
driving their retiring behaviour. While at first this might seem in contrast with
Gruber and Köszegi (2001), this could simply reflect a change in behaviour given
by heavier disincentives toward early retirement as a result of the many pension
system reforms occurring in Europe in the last fifteen years.
Considering the identification strategy and the IVFE model described above, we
are able to interpret the estimated coefficient for retirement as a local average
8Another possible threat would be given by retirement age thresholds being set as a function of
workers’ health in each country. While we cannot neglect the fact that position on requirement for
retirement could be salient points upon which to set voting behaviour, this seems unlikely given
that we are looking at a number of countries where retirement age thresholds have been shifted
upward mainly for general financial sustainability constraints. Yet , in any case, such a limitation
would apply to every study relying on early and normal retirement age as instrument.
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Austria 0.50 0.17 0.30 0.07 0,18
Germany 0.26 0.06 0.22 0.04 0.12
Spain 0.31 0.15 0.15 0.04 0.14
Italy 0.24 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.06
France 0.41 0.29 0.05 0.16 0.03
Belgium 0.39 0.37 0.13 0.15 0.10
Czech Rep 0,45 0,19 0.33 0.05 0.25
Slovenia 0.44 0.16 0.34 0.05 0.21
Estonia 0.34 0.27 0.30 0.05 0.13
Total 0.37 0.20 0.21 0.07 0.13
treatment effect (LATE) where our treatment is simply retiring between two
subsequent waves between which the worker became eligible for either early or
normal retirement. In other words, if our compliers are those individuals whose
behaviour is shifted by our instrument, becoming eligible and retiring in between
the same two waves defines our compliers.
2.5 Results
Table 2.4 summarizes our main set of results, taking into consideration self re-
ported retirement. Columns (1) and (2) report estimated coefficients of the first
stage for men and women respectively so, the dependent variable is a dummy
for retirement. In both groups our instruments are highly statistically significant.
In particular, as anticipated by descriptives in Table 2.3, reaching the ordinary
retirement age seem to be a more salient threshold in driving retiring decisions as
compared to reaching the eligibility criteria for early retirement. While reaching
64
Table 2.4: Results: Retirement as self declared status.
Effect of self-reported retirement on the probability of being at least in a pre-frail status. Odd
columns refer to male individuals while even ones are for women. Columns (1) and (2) report
estimates for the first stage. Columns (2) to (8) refer instead to the second stage.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE FE IV pooled IV pooled IV pooled IV pooled IVFE IVFE
retirement -0.204∗∗ -0.073 -0.237∗∗ -0.081 -0.284∗∗ -0.051





Education #yy -0.009 0.006 -0.003∗∗ -0.001 -0.003∗ -0.0009 -0.005 -0.007
(-0.81) (0.46) (-2.03) (-0.50) (-1.80) (-0.58) (-0.24) (-0.43)
One child -0.025 0.055∗∗ -0.006 0.021 -0.003 0.025 0.034 0.039
(-1.05) (2.17) (-0.37) (1.28) (-0.14) (1.52) (1.05) (1.15)
More than one child 0.014 0.037∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 0.005 0.005 0.010
(1.14) (2.59) (-0.49) (-0.01) (-0.33) (0.43) (0.27) (0.47)
Difficulties in MEM -0.017∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.012∗ -0.004 0.007
(-2.45) (-4.14) (-5.13) (-4.02) (-3.69) (-1.86) (-0.34) (0.77)
2+ Chronic cond. 0.018 0.017 0.064∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.032∗ -0.0122
(1.43) (1.38) (5.50) (5.72) (5.68) (5.93) (1.83) (-0.73)
2+ LDA -0.012 0.008 0.137∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.053 0.072∗∗
(-0.41) (0.32) (4.46) (4.41) (4.55) (4.52) (1.34) (2.09)
EUROD -0.005 -0.002 0.125∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(-1.61) (-0.84) (41.02) (50.72) (40.26) (50.59) (24.06) (30.76)
Constant -0.146 -0.336 0.519∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ -2.152∗∗ -2.745∗∗
(-0.69) (-1.46) (6.55) (2.81) (-1.98) (-2.01)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes
N 7698 7690 7698 7690 7698 7690 7678 7676
R2 0.457 0.434 0.220 0.275 0.219 0.283 0.117 0.184
JPval 0.469 0.035 0.460 0.487 0.492 0.437
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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the latter increases probability of retirement by only 6.2%, the former is associated
with an increased probability of retirement of about 24% and 21% for male and
females respectively.
As we move from column (3) to column (6) we have estimated coefficients for
IV models with pooled observations both with and without taking into account
country dummies. We do so to account for possible country specific health trends
that might be correlated with retirement decisions. As already mentioned, the
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable taking value one for individuals
being at least in a pre-frail status. The coefficients for retirement entail a decrease
between 20.4% and 23.7% of the probability of being in a pre-frail status or beyond
form men. For women the coefficient would translate in a decrease between 7.3%
and 8.1% but, for this group there is no statistical significance.
Columns (7) and (8) display estimated coefficients for our IV fixed effect model.
Similarly to previous estimates the coefficient of retirement is significant for males
but not for females. For the formers, according to IVFE estimates, retirement
as instrumented by reaching either early or statutory retirement age, causes a
decrease in the probability of being in (at least a) pre-frail status by 28%. The
coefficient for female is of the expected sign with a point estimate of -0.051.
A possible interpretation of the lack of significance for women draws on the
different timing in the onset of the first markers of frailty between the two gender
and its relation with retirement patterns. As a matter of fact, as confirmed in
Table 2.1, women have a higher average frailty index and a prevalence of pre-frail
statuses higher by 8% with respect to men. Such difference is true for the age
range considered in our study but in the literature (Theou et al. (2015), Harttgen
et al. (2013)) it is a well known fact holding at any age. To the extend to which, as
compared to men, women’s pre-frail status arises earlier with respect to possible
retirement channels (and taking into account the cumulative nature of such
syndrome in which every marker represent a risk factor for the others leading to
deficits accumulation), women’s exit from the labor force might occur on average
at a relative later stage of development of frailty. This could translate in lower
chances of reversibility from retirement.
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Another possible explanation refers to the persistence of gender norms within
the family. As women retire, they could substitute (at least more, as compared to
men) working for pay with work at home. This would entail a difference in the
persistence of stressor factor after retirement that could translate into a limited
change in the path of defict accumulation for women versus a decrease among
men.
To conclude the analysis of the first set of results, despite the almost zero point
estimates, it is interesting to note how the fixed effect model do not drop controls
like education years or any of the dummies for children, indicating at least a tiny
within variation in the sample. Lastly, going back to the vality of the instruments,
throughout the whole set of results, looking at the p-value for the Hansen’s J
statistic we fail to reject the joint null of valid instrument.
In Table 2.5 we replicate the analysis of Table 2.4 with a more restrictive definition
of retirement. Rather than simply relying on self-reported job status, we further
condition on not having done any paid job during the last four weeks. In so doing
we cope with possible downward biases in the estimates arising from sampled
individuals framing retirement as retiring from the main job characterizing the
career of an individual rather than a real exit from the labor force. As individuals
who retire from their "career job" self-declare as retired while carrying out some
other paid activity, the coefficient for retirement would not really capture the
effect of exiting the labor force. As a consequence, if this is indeed an issue one
would expect to obtain much larger point estimates (in absolute value) when this
further condition is applied.
Looking a Table 2.5 we see that in term of significance, estimated coefficients are
are overall following the same patterns as in Table 2.5. With particular regard to
the point estimates of the coefficient for retirement, we see larger point estimates
(again in absolute value) in the pooled IV models where the coefficient passes from
-0.204 and -0.237 (-0.073 and -0.081) to -0.356 and -0.412 (-0.092 and -0.090) for
men (women). Interestingly, in the IV model with fixed effects the coefficient is
larger for male individuals as compared to Table 2.4 but not for female. As a male
worker reaches either early or statutory retirement eligibility criteria in between
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two subsequent waves and decide to retire in between the same two waves, its
probability of being in at least a pre-frail status is lower by almost 52%.
It is worth remembering that given the LATE interpretation of the coefficient of
retirement, we can only attribute the estimated effect to those individuals whose
behaviour has been shifted by our instruments, which in our case are having
reached retirement eligibility criteria. According to the definition of retirement of
Table 2.5 these individuals are roughly 18% of the male sample and 21% female
one.9
9Percentages are taken by summing the coefficient of the instrumental variables in columns (1)
and (2) and should be referred to the pooled sample.
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Table 2.5: Results: Retirement as not working for pay.
Effect of retirement defined self-reported status conditioned on not having done any paid job
during the last 4 weeks on the probability of being at least in a pre-frail status. Odd columns refer
to male individuals while even ones are for women.Columns (1) and (2) report estimates for the
first stage. Columns (2) to (8) refer instead to the second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE FE IV pooled IV pooled IV pooled IV pooled IVFE IVFE
Retirement v2 -0.356∗∗ -0.092 -0.412∗∗ -0.090 -0.517∗∗ -0.036





Education #yy 0.008 -0.005 -0.004∗∗ -0.001 -0.004∗∗ -0.001 0.002 -0.007
(0.76) (-0.50) (-2.24) (-0.53) (-2.12) (-0.57) (0.12) (-0.46)
One child -0.019 0.036 -0.007 0.019 -0.003 0.023 0.031 0.038
(-0.86) (1.57) (-0.38) (1.17) (-0.18) (1.41) (0.90) (1.11)
More than one child 0.007 0.027∗∗ -0.007 -0.001 -0.005 0.005 0.004 0.009
(0.58) (2.07) (-0.60) (-0.09) (-0.45) (0.36) (0.23) (0.44)
Difficulties in MEM -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.012 ∗ -0.009 0.008
(-2.93) (-2.87) (-5.36) (-4.05) (-4.00) (-1.84) (-0.81) (0.84)
2+ Chronic cond. 0.016 0.021 0.066∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.036 ∗ -0.013
(1.33) (1.73) (5.44) (5.74) (5.61) (5.89) (1.92) (-0.73)
2+ LDA -0.032 -0.018 0.138∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.039 0.071∗∗
(-1.12) (-0.74) (4.44) (4.32) (4.53) (4.42) (0.95) (2.05)
EUROD -0.002 -0.004 0.125∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(-0.72) (-1.61) (40.52) (50.56) (39.72) (50.47) (23.56) (30.35)
Constant -0.172 -0.136 0.583∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ -1.749 -2.857∗∗
(-0.85) (-0.67) (5.55) (2.74) (-1.45) (-2.03)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes
N 7698 7690 7698 7690 7698 7690 7678 7676
R2 0.344 0.307 0.188 0.27 0.176 0.283 0.050 0.186
JPval 0.342 0.026 0.773 0.354 0.847 0.385
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.5.1 Robustness
A significant threat to the relevance of this study could lay on the effect of retire-
ment working only through one of the five markers of frailty taken into considera-
tion to build the index. To address this concern, we replicate the analysis of Table
2.4 excluding one marker at the time by the frailty index and still dichotomizing
the resulting score distinguishing between individuals at least in a pre-frail status
and fit ones. Results are displayed in Table 2.6.
The estimated coefficients remain significant at least at 10% significance level for
each model among male individuals. In absolute terms, the minimum is reached
excluding exhaustion (-0.163) while the highest estimated coefficient is obtained
disregarding slowness (-0.319). Coefficient remain insignificant among women for
every model under consideration with even a positive coefficient for the model
excluding limited physical activity. Overall, these results seem indicative of an
actual protective role of retirement with respect to frailty at least among men
and it does not appear to be mainly driven by one of the distinct markers under
consideration.
Table 2.6: Robustness: partial definition of frailty
IVFE estimates of the effect of self-declared retirement status on the probability of being at least in
a pre-frail status excluding one marker at the time from the defini-
tion of the frailty index. Model and specification as in columns (7) and (8) of Table 2.4 and Table 2.5.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
noLPA noLPA noSLO noSLO noWEAK noWEAK noSHK noSHK noEXH noEXH
retirement -0.204∗ 0.0543 -0.319∗∗∗ -0.111 -0.238∗ -0.0612 -0.285∗∗ -0.0704 -0.163∗ -0.008
(-2.29) (0.62) (-3.32) (-1.18) (-2.56) (-0.65) (-2.97) (-0.76) (-2.06) (-0.10)
N 7676 7673 7676 7673 7676 7673 7676 7673 7676 7673
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.6 Conclusion
In this study we investigated the causal effect of retirement on frailty among older
Europeans exploiting cross and within country variation in retirement eligibility
criteria as instrumental variables. Results highlight a significant and sizeable
protective role of retirement among men but no significant results for women. As
a male worker become eligible for either eraly or statutory retirement consequently
decide to retire in between the same two waves, the probability of being at least
in a pre-frail status decreases between 28.4% and 51.7% depending on whether
retirement is defined as self-declared status or further conditioning on not having
done any work for pay for the past four weeks. The larger point estimates for
the model using a more restrictive definition of retirement are indicative of some
individuals considering retirement as withdrawal from their main occupation
rather than actual exit from the labor force.
Possible non mutually exclusive explanations with regard the asymmetric sig-
nificance of the results between gender are briefly described. On the one hand
the lack of significant results for women could be due to earlier onset of the
pre-frail statuses which could make retirement less effective in protecting against
the development of deficit accumulation. On the other hand, another explanation
could refer to the possible different meaning that retirement have between the two
gender. While in general we think of retirement as a moment of abstention from
stressor working activities, to the extent to which women simply substitute work-
ing for pay on the the job with working at home, retirement might not represent
the unbend period that could instead represent for men.
Results are robust to partial definition of the index used to operationalize the
frail phenotype definition. Overall, at least for men, results indicate a significant
protective role of retirement with respect to frailty and in particular to pre-frail
conditions. Due to the high predictive power of frailty with respect to deficit
accumulation, health decline and extreme outcomes such as dependency and
death, this study can at least partially shed some light on the long term effect of
retirement on health. This being said it is also true that a conclusive assessment of
the health effect of retirement should also consider all the dimensions of health
71
that are disregarded by the present study, such as cognitive abilities and mental
health.
Finally we want to briefly mention possible further steps of the research on frailty
in economics. In particular, given recent developments in the investigation of
the genetic roots of frailty (Inglés et al. (2019)) it would be possible to estimate
individual level polygenic scores of genetic predisposition to frailty which could
be leveraged to further investigate the heterogeneous effect of retirement along
the genetic dimension.10
10By polygenic score we refer a measure of genetic predisposition to a given phenotype that
is computed starting from the estimation of the effect on the phenotype of interest (in this case
frailty) of genetic mutation hapening at the level of the single building block of our DNA. With




Child Adoption: the Role of Couples’ Prefer-
ences in the Screening and Matching Process
joint with
Davide Dragone - University of Bologna
Nektaria Glynia - University of Bologna
Abstract In this paper we investigate prospective adoptive parents’ preferences
thanks to a completely novel dataset from the Emilia-Romagna Region in Italy.
Thanks to detailed information on the screening process from 2007 to 2010, we
are able to understand how couples self select into the national vs international
adoption process and how their preferences over adoptive children affect their
chances of being matched to a child with specific characteristics.
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3.1 Introduction
In Italy, roughly one out of ten individuals is interested by the phenomenon of
adoption either as adoptive parent, adopted child or other degree of kinship.1
Despite the magnitude, there is a significant lack of available data on the matter,
especially outside the US (e.g. Baccara (2014) and Skidmore et al. (2013)).
The strength of this novel dataset is that we not only have data on the matching
between couples and children but we also have extensive information on the the
application process on the universe of applicant couples, regardless of their success
in the adoption process. This allows to explicitly investigate the degree of selection
into adoption. More precisely, in this paper we answer the following questions:
what are parental preferences over adoptive children? Do preferences reflect
quality throughout the screening process? Do preferences affect the probability
of adoption? Do they affect the waiting time? Do preferences really map into the
adopted child characteristics?
3.2 Literature
Despite the size of the phenomenon, as well as the particular interesting matching
mechanisms that occur in the adoption market between the demand side (pro-
spective adoptive parents) and the supply (relinquished children), adoption has
not received much attention by economists. Early works on adoption includes
studies that focus on the demand side of adoption. Jones (2009) provides a de-
scriptive overview of the adoption market in the US using survey data. Declining
fertility rates has been identified as an important factor driving the demand for
children through the adoption channel. Gumus and Lee (2012) study the sub-
stitutability of children adoption with reproductive technologies as alternative
ways to parenthood. Their results indicate a substitutability of child adoption
with assisted reproductive technology (ART), i.e. a 10% increase in adoption will
result in a 1.5% decrease in ART. Doyle and Peters (2007) study the relationship
between state subsidies paid to foster families with the quality of foster care ser-
vices provided. Their starting point is the shortage of foster care homes and excess
1Italia Adozioni Survey Report, 2019.
demand identified in the 1980s and 1990s. They show that state governments with
high demand for foster care can use, up to a point, subsidies to attract foster famil-
ies More recently, Oldani (2017) reports that the demand for adoptive children is
empirically investigated in lights of the relation between parental satisfaction and
the characteristics of both the procedure itself and those of the adoptive children.
Findings show that adoptive parents’ satisfaction is inversely correlated with the
child’s age and the duration of the adoption procedure.
This study also touches the literature related to the effect early of childhood
conditions on later children outcomes. Aizer and Doyle (2014) review methods
and studies regarding child adoption and support, family planning, education
and health policy to analyze causal effects of child welfare interventions on child
outcomes. Hansen (2008b) proves that child adoptions provide important long-
term benefits to children. Her analysis considers a wide range of post-adoption
outcomes including the child’s behavior, health, education, criminal activity and
eventually employment. Recent papers focus on the prospective parents’ pref-
erences over children’s relinquished for adoption characteristics. For instance,
Skidmore et al. (2013) study which factors affect adoptive parents’ preferences
over adoptive child characteristics and how these are expressed and translated to
differences in the costs of adoption. The analysis shows the source of variation in
adoption costs is child characteristics. These costs are significantly lower for older
children, children of African descent, and children with special needs. Baccara et
al. (2014) study the preferences of prospective adoptive parents over (US-born
or unborn) children’s attributes like gender and race. Using a novel dataset of
the US child-adoption market they show that prospective adoptive parents show
significant preference in favor of girls and unborn children while at the same
time they are much less in favor for African American children. The results are
robust when they control for differences with respect to prospective parents’ char-
acteristics such as same-sex, heterosexual or single mothers. How they show that
racial preferences are 3 times higher in magnitude for straight couples while same-




Child adoption in Italy is ruled under the law 184/1983. In Italy adoption is
allowed only to heterosexual couples married since at least three years or with at
least three years of demonstrable partnership with cohabitation. Adoptive parent
shall not have less than 18 years of age difference with the adopted child and more
than 45, at least for one adoptive parent, and 55 for the the other.
Adoption can be generally declined in three big categories: national adoption, in-
ternational adoption and special cases. The first one is organized under the actives
of the juvenile court together with social assistants for screening, matching and
assessment. The second one is dependent on an official declaration of eligibility
to adoption by the juvenile court and then follows different paths depending on
the couple’s preference over country and the private entity assisting the couple in
the proceedings. The last one mainly refers to cases of stepchild adoption. In the
present chapter, we will focus on the first one, referring to international adoption
only as general outside option.
The journey to adoption of a prospective adoptive couple in Italy starts with
seminars and workshops held by social assistants units, where the couple is intro-
duced to the procedures and expectations on both the proceedings and adoptive
parenthood. Once couples decide to start the procedures they are required to
undergo to an inquiry by the social assistants covering their background, current
status, motivations and expectation. The completion of the inquiry generally
takes between two and six months depending on social assistance units. Once the
inquiry is complete, couples can deposit their application to the juvenile court.
The application can refer to the national adoption process, the international one or
even both. The court examines the inquiry sent directly from the social assistants
and set an interview with the couple. After taking vision of the inquiry, an honor-
ary member of the court interviews the couple with the aim of the assessment of
the required capabilities of the prospective parents as well as their availabilities
with respect to kid’s health conditions, legal condition, age, gender and even their
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number.2 In the Juvenile Court of Emilia Romagna the overall quality of a couple
is summarized in a color scheme which can be translated into a score going from
one to four where four is the maximum quality. 3 From the time of the submitting
of the application the the couple stays in the pool of potential pick for up to three
years. As new cases of abandoned kids emerge, the court examines the list of
couples available at a given time. If a couple do not finalize the adoption within
such a period it can repeat the procedure and re-file the application.
3.4 Data
Overall, the dataset contains information on the screening and matching activities
of the Emilia Romagna Region Juvenile Court from 2005 to 2010. For years 2005
to 2007 we have detailed demographic information (e.g. from age at application
to date of marriage and occupation to whether parents are alive and available
to assist the couple in raising a kid), detailed information on their preferences
(e.g. self declared preferences at beginning of the screening procedure and final
preferences over age, gender, health, legal risk, religion and ethnicity) as well as
information on the timing of the application and its proceedings (e.g. time of the
beginning of the inquiry with social assistant units, time of presentation of the
application, time of the meeting with honorary judges, evaluators’ id as well as
their evaluation etc...).
For 2005 and 2006 we only observe unmatched couples: those whose application
has remained outstanding for the entire three years consideration period. For
2007 we observed both unmatched and matched couples. For the latter group
we therefore also observe the kid with which the couple has been matched. Such
information refers to the demographics of the child (e.g. date of birth, gender
and for a sub-sample of the records also the nationality of the biological mother.)
2By legal condition we refer to the presence of a so called legal risk. A kid is considered under
legal risk if he/she has been withdrawn from his/her biological family who is (or could) take action
against the decision of the court.
3Formally, no application for national adoption is rejected as filing the application legally
simply means declaring the availability to adopt. On the other hand, for international adoption,
after the screening interview the court decides whether to grant to the couple a declaration of
adaptability which is necessary condition to continue the adoption proceedings abroad.
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and information on the timing of the matching (e.g. child age at declaration of
adaptability, date at first contact with adoptive parents). For 2007, we also tract
some information on the international adoption such as the country from which
the child comes from.
For years 2008 to 2010 we focus on national adoptions tracking both matched and
unmatched couples with slightly less detailed information. For these years we
observe general demographics like age at application, education and occupation;
final preferences (excluding ethnicity and religion) and couples’ evaluation. For
those who are matched we also observe the date of birth of the kid, the date of de-
claration of adoptability, the date of the kid entering the adoptive family. Despite
not tracking any application specific for the international adoption proceeding, we
observe whether or not a couple who applied for both national and international
adoption finally adopt a child from the international channel.
Table 3.1: Descriptive
Demographics and adoptive preferences by application outcomes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Avg. whole sample Avg. Unmatched Avg. Matched Int. Avg. Matched Nat.
Demographics
age male partner 41.56 42.01 42.14 39.17
age female partner 40.10 40.59 40.65 37.63
years since married 8.37 8.89 7.71 8.08
years of education male partner 13.33 12.92 13.55 14.03
years of education female partner 14.14 13.85 14.15 14.97
biological kid(s) 0.13 0.19 0.07 0.04
at least another adopted kid 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.06
Preferences
maximum age 5.29 5.21 5.45 5.22
age range 4.99 4.82 5.16 5.13
any gender preference 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01
available for gender male 0.96 0.94 0.97 1
available for gender female 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
number 1.19 1.17 1.19 1.23
Avlbl. legal risk 0.55 0.53 0.5 0.73
Avlbl. health risk 0.91 0.87 0.92 0.96
Avlbl. handicap 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.21
Score (1 to 4) 2.78 2.43 2.95 3.52
N. 1530 777 489 264
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Table 3.1 summarises demographics informations and preferences across different
subsets of applicants couples from 2007 as a function of their application out-
comes. The average applicant couple is married since 8 years with partners being
40 and 42 years old for female and male partner respectively. Age is generally com-
parable in the case of unmatched couples and couples going in the international
market while couples matched in the national adoption process are significantly
younger by roughly two years. On average, the female partner has a higher educa-
tional attainment than the male one, and this holds true throughout the different
samples. In the whole sample 13% of the applicant couples have a biological kid
while 14% have already adopted. Interestingly, among couples who successfully
pursue international adoption the percentages of those with a biological kid is
roughly half that of the entire sample while 15% have already adopted. On the
other hand, couples matched in national adoption process have significantly lower
probabilities of both having a biological kid (4%) and having already adopted
(6%). This could be both due to preferences over the international market for
couples who have already adopted or preference of the court over couples without
either a biological or adopted kids with respect to matching. Both explanations
have anecdotal support. From the analysis of the application packages and the
inquiries of the social assistance emerges clearly how couples with adopted kids
tends to prefer the international market to ensure some homogeneity of origins
and traits between kids adopted sequentially. At the same time, judges in charge
of the evaluation tend to consider carefully the potential negative externalities on
the existent household other kids.
Preferences in the unrestricted sample define an average desired kid of a maximum
of five years of age. Preference over a given gender is present in 4% of the
population of applicant couples and when it is present it is practically always for
a female kid. 55% of the applicants are available to bear legal risk and more than
91% is willing to face some sort of health risk while only 14% would accept an
handicapped kid. The profile of the desired kid changes only slightly for matched
couples with lower prevalence of any preference for gender. On the other hand
prospective adoptive parents who manage to be matched in the national adoption
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process are significantly more likely to be willing to bear legal risk (73%) as well
as general health risk (86%) and handicap conditions (21%).
As expected, the distribution of the evaluation score reflects the outcome taken
under considerations. For couples presenting their application in 2007, 17%
managed to get a kid under the national adoption process (average evaluation
score of 3.52 out of 4) while a little under 32% completed international adoption
(average evaluation score of 2.95 out of 4).
3.5 Methodology
In line with the descriptive aim of the paper, we adopt simple regression analysis as
well as multinomial logit to assess to investigate the association between preference
and screening and matching outcomes. In the same spirit, with respect to waiting
times we adopt survival analysis and Cox regressions. With this regard we model
the duration of the time remaining in the pool waiting to be matched. Thus,
longer survival time actually translates in waiting longer to be matched, up to a
maximum of three years of elapsed time. In this survival framework, matching
represent the "death" event. We proxy the time of the matching with the day since
when the adopted kid starts living with the adoptive family, regardless of the
actual officialization of the adoption.
In order to avoid unbalanced samples given by the structure of the information
collected for the different years we only consider data from 2007 onward. The
main dependent variables taken into account are the outcome of the screening
process, the probability of the matching and the duration of the waiting time to
matching.
3.6 Results
The first measurable outcome in the adoption process is the screening after applic-
ation is filed. As mentioned above, in the Juvenile Court of Emilia Romagna, such
screening is performed by honorary judges evaluating the couple’s motivation and
capabilities from the inquiry by the social assistants and the interview with the
couple. The score goes from 1 to 4 but there is no official cut-off to reach to be
eligible for adoption.
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For both regressions (1) and (2) in Table 3.2 we control for a set of dummies
capturing male and female partner occupational role. Adding the set of covariates
describing couple’s preference over adoption, the point estimates and the signific-
ance of the coefficient vary only slightly. The age of the female is significant and
negatively related to the score. Estimates suggests the same for the years since
when the couple is married and having any gender preferences. Higher scores for
younger couples could probably be explained by stronger motivations. In terms
of what has a significant and positive impact on the evaluation of the couple, the
estimates highlight educational attainment of both the male and female partner
(with the second one having a higher point estimate), having already adopted, age
range being available for legal risk, health risk and handicapped minors.
In Table 3.3 columns (1) and (2) we take the same exact specification as in Table
3.2 with the only addition of the score. As a dependent variable we adopt a
dichotomous variable for being matched in a national adoption. With no surprises
the score is positive and significant and the age of both partners is significant
and negatively related with probability of adoption. Educational attainment is
significant only for the female partner while having a biological kid and having
already adopted is significantly negatively related with probability of matching.
With respect to preferences over adoption the only significant coefficient is that of
availability to legal risk.4
These two set of estimates suggest how screening and matching are indeed separate
processes taking into account different dimensions. The most interesting results
are the ambivalent role of having already adopted (and having biological kids)
with regard to the different dependent variable. While on the side of the score
specification such variable capture a higher level of familiar capabilities gained
4The careful reader could highlight the possibility of omitted variable bias with regard to di-
mensions such as preferences of the judges or information conveyed in the inquiry are not included
in the specification. This could indeed be the case and for this reason, in an extended version of the
current paper we are actually taking into account also these measurements. Including dummies
for evaluating judges reduces the magnitude of the point estimates but not the significance of
the coefficients. We are currently also working on the summarizing the textual information of
the inquiries by means of principal component analysis to further account for possible omitted
variable bias.
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through experience, on the side of the matching this represent a possible added
risk to the stability of the future adoptive family. Similarly, while availability to
legal risk health risk and handicapped conditions are positive predictors of a high
score, only the first one remain significant in the second stage of the adoptive
process.
Column (3) and (4) of Table 3.3 focus being matched to an infant conditionally on
being matched to some kid. We define an infant as a kid who has been abandoned
at the hospital right after being born. These kids are generally declared adoptable
within few weeks from their birth and with regard to the preferences over adoption
taken into account by the process they could be seen as kids with highest degree
of desirability because of their age and the lack ant legal risk. The significant
variable for these models are the age of the male partner, with negative sign and
the preference profile over the age of the kid which sums to zero for couple with
preferred age range equal to the maximum desired age (which imply negative
effect overall for couples with preference for a smaller age range with respect to
their maximum age). Despite the lack of significance, it is interesting to note the
negative sign of the coefficient for availability to legal risk, suggesting the attempt
to optimal matching taking into account the characteristics of the kids and the
preferences of the couples.
83
Table 3.2: Evaluation score regression on demographics and adoption preferences.
(1) (2)
score score
age male partner -0.00856 -0.00985
(-1.06) (-1.27)
age female partner -0.0257*** -0.0201**
(-2.99) (-2.36)
year since married -0.0164** -0.0143**
(-2.50) (-2.27)
educational attainment male partner 0.0268** 0.0285***
(2.50) (2.79)
educational attainment female partner 0.0403*** 0.0350***
(3.51) (3.24)
any biological kids 0.0531 0.0598
(0.51) (0.58)






any gender preference -0.412**
(-2.24)




Avlbl. legal risk 0.139**
(2.38)






male partner occupation Y Y
female partner occupation Y Y
N 1044 1007
R-sq 10.6 15.4
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Table 3.3: Logistic regressions for adoption matching on demographics and adop-
tion preferences.









score 1.117*** 1.025*** 0.333 0.329
(8.63) (7.40) (1.06) (1.04)
age male partner -0.127*** -0.130*** -0.210*** -0.207***
(-3.91) (-3.95) (-3.62) (-3.54)
age female partner -0.0735*** -0.0785*** 0.0300 0.0414
(-2.60) (-2.66) (0.49) (0.67)
year since married 0.0345 0.0377 -0.0841* -0.0950*
(1.20) (1.29) (-1.70) (-1.77)
educational attainment male partner 0.0700* 0.0673* 0.0207 0.0354
(1.79) (1.65) (0.28) (0.46)
educational attainment female partner 0.121*** 0.123*** -0.0864 -0.103
(2.60) (2.59) (-1.19) (-1.41)
any biological kids -1.844*** -1.792*** 1.242 1.232
(-3.42) (-3.22) (1.29) (1.25)
at least another adopted kid -2.139*** -1.815*** -0.427 -0.577
(-4.13) (-3.34) (-0.37) (-0.49)
maximum age 0.0248 -4.169***
(0.13) (-13.56)
age range 0.0958 4.196***
(0.44) (13.77)
any gender preference 1.272 0.001
(1.38) (0.02)




Avlbl. legal risk 0.582*** -0.310
(2.71) (-0.69)
Avlbl. Health risk 0.328 -0.247
(0.66) (-0.32)
Avlbl. Handicap 0.403 -0.189
(1.21) (-0.35)
constant -128 -0.817 6.937*** 7.150***
(-0.11) (-0.62) (2.80) (2.59)
male partner occupation Y Y Y Y
female partner occupation Y Y Y Y
N 1038 970 171 168
pseudo R-sq 0.274 0.271 0.171 0.183
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Figure 3.1: Marginal effects of female partner age at application on (a) the prob-
ability of having a score higher or equal than three and (b) probability of being
matched
(a) (b)
To better grasp the role in terms of probability, of the most important and interest-
ing independent variables from the model above we compute and plot marginal
effect. Figure 3.1 shows the marginal effect of age at application with both respect
to score (a) and matching (b) by groups determined by having already adopted or
not. In addition to the clear negative impact of age with respect to both outcomes,
the graphs highlights the dual role of preavious experience with adopted kid.
Figure 3.2 shows how low the probability of matching in the national adoption
process really is for couples who either have a biological kid or either have already
adopted. For applicants without any previous experience the probability of
successful national adoption are between 20 and 30% in case of a score of 4 out of
4. The probability shrinks to around 10% for a score of 3 out of 4 going practically
to zero for a score of 1 out of 4.
In the last part of this section we focus on waiting times. Figure 3.4 shows survival
curves of the applicant couples by evaluation score. Average survival time in
the pool of couple available to adoptions is 3 and 2.97 years respectively for
couples with evaluation score respectively of 1 and 2. Couples with a score of 3
wait on average 2.46 years while applicants with the highest evaluation wait on
average 2 years. Assuming a constant inflow of kids, this averages and graphs
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Figure 3.2: Marginal effects of the evaluation score on matching probability by (a)
having already adopted and (b) having other biological kids.
(a) (b)
are consistent with a first in first out processing of the application of prospective
adoptive parents.
In Figure 3.5 we condition on having a score higher or equal to three and plot the
survival curves by availability to legal risk. As expected couples with availability
to legal risk exit the pool at a higher rate but timing at which they start exiting
does not seem to be statistically different from one group to another.
Finally, Figure 3.6 summarizes hazard ratios from Cox regressions for being
matched. As it was for the estimates from the logistic probability models, the
most relevant predictors are having a high score (dichotomous variable for score
greater or equal to three), availability to legal risk and college degree of the female
partner.
3.7 Conclusion
In this last chapter we provided quantitative descriptive evidence from a novel
dataset on the phenomenon of national adoption taking a close look at the screen-
ing and matching process and the role of preferences of prospective adoptive
parents. In the Emilia Romagna region in Italy, screening and matching processes
are distinct phases. Applicants couple have on average preferences for kids in
pre-scholar age. If they have any preference over the gender of the kid it is for
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Figure 3.3: Survival curve by evaluation score
Figure 3.4: Survival curve by availability to legal risk
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Figure 3.5: Hazard ratios of being matched
females. Most of the applicant couples declare themselves willing to bear some
sort of health risk while only 50% is available to face legal risk, which is the
possibility appeal from the biological family of the minor declared adoptable. The
availability to be matched with an handicapped minor is stated only by 14% of the
applicants. Only couples with a sufficient screening evaluation have a real chance
of being matched to a kid. On top of it, the most important aspect to consider
in order to increase the chances of a successful national adoption application is
the availability to bear legal risk. The most significant predictor for a successful
screening process are the age of the couple and the duration of their marriage
at time of the application, the educational attainment of the female partner, the
lack of any gender preference and the availability for health risk, legal risk and
handicapped condition. Interestingly, having already adopted a kid in the past
has a positive and significant impact on the screening phase but is negatively
associated with matching probability. Waiting times are heterogeneous across
different evaluation scores and reflects the quality of the couple summarized by
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